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ABSTRACT
BLAME, DESERT, AND TERMINATION
Vikram R. Bhargava
Alan Strudler
Kok-Chor Tan
This dissertation concerns the ethics of responding to transgressors of morality through means available to us
as members of society (as opposed to the question of how the state ought to respond to wrongdoers). I focus on
the question of how firms should respond when an employee is the subject of mass outrage due to performing
some allegedly immoral conduct outside the workplace. Since managers often feel pressure to respond swiftly in
such scenarios, it is important that they have clarity about the normative issues. The first step of the argument
involves defending the claim that firings in certain contexts constitute expressions of blame. The second step of
the argument discusses the nature and ethics of blame. In particular, I argue that since blaming is a
communal practice, there are coordination problems that prospective blamers must attend to and that the
appropriateness of an act of blame depends on how much others blame. I conclude that there is strong moral
reason against firing an employee in response to outside of work immoral conduct that generates mass outrage.
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION
Introduction
Many of us work. Many of us also act in ways that, at least occasionally, violate
standards that have a social or communal character—e.g., through breaching etiquette,
flouting norms, or transgressing morality. Sometimes, these violations happen when we are
away from work. While the facts that people work and violate such standards when away
from work have been true for centuries, recent technological advances, most notably social
media, affect the nature of how we as a community should respond to these violations in
normatively significant ways. Importantly, these advances also affect how employers should
respond to these violations in normatively significant ways.
This dissertation concerns the ethics of responding to transgressors of morality
through means available to us as members of society (as opposed to how the state ought to
respond to wrongdoers). I am especially interested in the question of how an employer
should act in response to an employee’s outside of work immoral conduct that gives rise to a
“Twitter trial.” Roughly, a Twitter trial involves mass social media outrage directed at
someone for performing allegedly immoral conduct. Here is one such example.
Shortly prior to taking off from Heathrow International Airport to spend the
holidays with her family in Cape Town, Justine Sacco tweeted: “Going to Africa. Hope I
don’t get AIDS. Just kidding. I’m white!”1 While she was airborne, unbeknownst to Sacco,
her tweet went viral. By the time she landed in South Africa, her social media accounts and

1

Jon Ronson, So You’ve Been Publicly Shamed (Picador, 2015), 68.
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e-mail were flooded with condemnatory messages. At the time of her tweet, Sacco was thirty
years of age and a senior director for corporate communications for an internet and media
business company, InterActive Corp (IAC). In the month prior to her tweet, the name
“Justine Sacco” was searched on Google thirty times. In the ten days following her tweet, it
was searched 1,220,000 times.2
Before Sacco’s flight had landed, IAC publicly stated, “This is an outrageous,
offensive comment that does not reflect the views and values of IAC. Unfortunately, the
employee in question is unreachable on an international flight, but this is a very serious
matter and we are taking appropriate action.”3 IAC fired Sacco within a day.
When an employee is at the center of a Twitter trial, businesses commonly respond
by firing the employee. The scenario involving Sacco is a paradigm example of a Twitter
trial. To be clear, it is not the fact that Sacco wrote the message on Twitter that makes it a
Twitter trial, but rather, it is the social media outrage on Twitter (or other social media);
Twitter trials can occur for conduct or speech that does not occur on the internet.
In this dissertation, I defend the following thesis: firing an employee in response to
his or her outside of work immoral conduct that gives rise to a Twitter trial constitutes an
inappropriate form of blame. To arrive at this thesis, I defend the following:

Ibid., 71. Some social media commentators were calling for Sacco to be fired (“#IAC needs to fire this racist,
stupid bitch!”), others were enthusiastically waiting to see how events would unfold (“We are about to watch
[Sacco] get fired. In REAL time. Before she even KNOWS she’s getting fired.”), and still others were rejoicing
in her sudden ignominy (“I cannot stop laughing at the sheer stupidity of #JustineSacco, enjoy your time in the
unemployment line…”). The social media responses to Sacco’s tweet seem to sometimes take the form of what
Justin Tosi and Brandon Warmke call moral grandstanding. Moral grandstanding involves, roughly, engaging in
public moral discourse to solicit positive moral judgments about one’s own moral respectability. See Justin Tosi
and Brandon Warmke, “Moral Grandstanding,” Philosophy & Public Affairs 44, no. 3 (June 1, 2016): 197–217.
3 Ted Coine and Mark Babbitt, A World Gone Social: How Companies Must Adapt to Survive (New York:
AMACOM, 2014), 29.
2
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1. The Firing Claim: Firing an employee in response to mass social media outrage
brought about by the employee’s allegedly immoral conduct constitutes an
expression of blame.
2. The Additivity Principle: The appropriateness of an act of blame depends on
how much others blame.
The first is a claim unique to organizational contexts. The second is a general principle
relevant in any instance one is blaming another, but it is especially salient in the context of
Twitter trials.
Firing an employee can be a decision of significant consequence. Nevertheless, in the
United States, the overwhelming majority of states presume employment at-will (EAW).
This is the legal presumption that employers can terminate an employee for good reason,
bad reason, or no reason, and with or without warning.4 While some philosophers and
business ethicists have argued that such a view of the employment relation is morally
problematic,5 little philosophical attention has been devoted to the ethics of firing an
employee for immoral conduct.6 Some legal scholars who have written about immoral
conduct outside of the workplace have done so under the heading of "lifestyle
Similarly, employees can quit with or without reason and with or without warning. There are certain
exceptions to employment at-will, namely, the constitutionally protected classes: race, gender, sexual
orientation, and so on—see, Mark Bennett, Donald Polden, and Howard Ruben, Employment Relationships: Law
& Practice, LSLF (Aspen Publishers, 1998). There are interesting philosophical questions that arise with regard
to the extent to which the employment relation is symmetrical (e.g., is it permissible for an employee to quit a
job due to a manager’s immoral conduct outside of work?).
5 See, for example, R.T. De George, Business Ethics (Prentice Hall, 1995); Patricia Werhane and Tara J Radin,
“Employment at Will and Due Process,” Ethical Issues in Business: A Philosophical Approach (6th Ed.). Upper Saddle
River, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1999; Patricia Werhane, Tara J Radin, and Norman E Bowie, Employment and Employee
Rights (John Wiley & Sons, 2008); John J McCall, “A Defense of Just Cause Dismissal Rules,” Business Ethics
Quarterly 13, no. 2 (2003): 151–75.
6 For a discussion regarding how firing an employee for outside of work conduct can impact free speech and its
associated moral and political values, see Bruce Barry, Speechless: The Erosion of Free Expression in the American
Workplace (Berrett-Koehler Publishers, 2007); Bruce Barry, “The Cringing and the Craven: Freedom of
Expression In, Around, and beyond the Workplace,” Business Ethics Quarterly 17, no. 2 (2007): 263–96.
4
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discrimination.” 7 Unfortunately, however, these scholars provide little in terms of moral
argument for the wrongness of firing an employee for off-duty immoral conduct. I argue
that a manager’s discretion to fire an employee for off-duty immoral conduct is more
morally limited than is commonly understood. Even if a business is not concerned with the
employee’s immoral conduct per se, but is rather strictly concerned about public relations,
my arguments provide strong moral reason against firing an employee in response to outside
of work immoral conduct in certain contexts.
The thesis I defend might strike some as counterintuitive, because if businesses are
morally permitted to fire employees for reasons related to performance and competitive
pressures, it seems odd that a business should not fire an employee for something as serious
as immoral behavior. One might think condemning immoral conduct through firing would
be a good thing for a socially and morally conscious business to do, and not at all, as I will
argue, something morally inappropriate. I will now offer a brief sketch of how I defend my
thesis that firing in response to a Twitter trial constitutes an inappropriate form of blame.
While firing is not paradigmatically an act of blame, the first step of my argument
involves supporting the claim that firing in response to a Twitter trial constitutes a form of
blaming (i.e., the firing claim). In doing so, I engage with the objection that a business is not
really trying to blame the employee, but is merely seeking to disassociate from him or her. In
particular, I defend the claim that whether the act of firing is or is not an act of blame does
not depend exclusively on the intentions of the manager. In some circumstances, the
intentions of the manager may be irrelevant to whether the firing is an act of blame.
Marvin Hill and James Allan Wright, Employee Lifestyle and off-Duty Conduct Regulation (Bna Books, 1993);
Stephen D Sugarman, “‘ Lifestyle’ Discrimination in Employment,” Berkeley Journal of Employment and Labor Law
24, no. 2 (2003): 377–438.
7
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The second step involves arguing that not only is the firing an expression of blame,
but it is an inappropriate form of blame. In recent discussions on the ethics of blame,
scholars have outlined various conditions that one must meet in order to appropriately
blame another.8 One of the least controversial of these conditions is that one should not
blame someone who does not deserve blame or blame someone beyond what she deserves. I
argue that a firm either will fail to meet this condition, or will act recklessly with respect to it,
when firing in response to outside of work immoral conduct that gives rise to a Twitter trial.
The general principle I defend is that the appropriateness of blaming depends on the extent
to which others are blaming—that is, one must account for the additivity principle of blame. I
argue this principle is especially relevant in Twitter trial contexts.

Moralized Contexts, Employment At-Will, and the Preference to Disassociate
There are many kinds of reasons that may ground a decision to fire an employee:
incompetence, disloyalty, cost, redundancy, disagreeability, malingering, and so on.
Identifying which reasons (or combination of reasons) justify dismissing an employee would
require developing a comprehensive theory of firing. I take on a more modest task: I am
concerned with firings that occur in moralized contexts. Specifically, I am concerned with

See, for example, Gerald Cohen, “Casting the First Stone: Who Can, and Who Can’t, Condemn the
Terrorists?,” Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 58 (2006): 113–36; Miranda Fricker, “What’s the Point of
Blame? A Paradigm Based Explanation,” Noûs 50, no. 1 (March 1, 2016): 165–83; Marilyn Friedman, “How to
Blame People Responsibly,” Journal of Value Inquiry 47, no. 3 (2013): 271; Linda Radzik, “On Minding Your
Own Business: Differentiating Accountability Relations within the Moral Community,” Social Theory and Practice
37, no. 4 (2011): 574–98; Gary Watson, “Standing in Judgment,” in Blame: Its Nature and Norms (New York:
Oxford University Press, 2012).
8
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the extent to which an employee’s outside of work immoral conduct in Twitter trial contexts
should be a determining factor in firing decisions.9
While the distinction between work-life and non-work-life can be fraught, I will
assume that in many instances one can reasonably tell when certain conduct is done “on the
job,” as it were, and when it is not. I also assume that there was no reason to fire the
employee prior to the immoral conduct. More precisely, the justification to fire was not
overdetermined, or even partially determined, by the employee’s conduct prior to the
allegedly immoral act.10
I am not considering cases in which the employee’s outside of work immoral act is
also of the most serious criminal sort (e.g., assault, rape, or murder), nor acts that wrong an
entire victim class through blatant racism, sexism, etc. (e.g, pejoratively addressing someone
using a racial slur).11 There are likely good moral reasons for why firing in these cases would
not be wrong, but the reason I exclude them here is that these cases are likely to entail a
I am concerned with firing. There are similar moral questions that arise regarding hiring, promotions,
bonuses, adverse consequences, refusing to work with certain customers or suppliers, etc. For example, should
exemplary conduct performed outside of work, such as donations and volunteerism, be considered in
workplace promotions? In this dissertation, I restrict my attention to firing.
10 The case of a celebrity is an interesting one. This is because, for many endorsement deals, the basis of the
deal is not what the celebrity is doing for the business, but the association with that person. In such cases, the
person is not separable from his or her work-related capacities. While I think how to respond to the immoral
conduct of celebrities is also an interesting question, in this dissertation, I focus on non-celebrities.
11 Some readers might think that Sacco’s tweet was blatantly racist. While I find this implausible (especially in
view of the example of blatant racism I have offered), I will not get into specifying the necessary and sufficient
conditions for what counts as blatant racism. For those interested in Sacco’s reflections after the tweet, here is a
letter she penned to the South African newspaper, The Star: “Words cannot express how sorry I am, and how necessary
it is for me to apologize to the people of South Africa, who I have offended due to a needless and careless tweet. There is an AIDS
crisis taking place in this country, that we read about in America, but do not live with or face on a continuous basis.
Unfortunately, it is terribly easy to be cavalier about an epidemic that one has never witnessed firsthand. For being insensitive to
this crisis—which does not discriminate by race, gender or sexual orientation, but which terrifies us all uniformly—and to the
millions of people living with the virus, I am ashamed. This is my father's country, and I was born here. I cherish my ties to South
Africa and my frequent visits, but I am in anguish knowing that my remarks have caused pain to so many people here; my family,
friends and fellow South Africans. I am very sorry for the pain I caused." See “Racist Aids Tweet: I Am Ashamed,”
Independent Online, December 23, 2013, http://www.iol.co.za/news/south-africa/western-cape/racist-aidstweet-i-am-ashamed-1625863.
9
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serious, potentially debilitating, economic burden or disruption to workplace culture and
operations.12 I am concerned with homing in on whether the mere fact of immoral conduct
outside of the workplace should ground firing decisions.
One might think excluding cases that disrupt the workplace or impose significant
economic burdens unduly idealizes the investigation. That is, one might argue Twitter trials
do impose significant economic burdens, and if there is a Twitter trial, this will always, or
almost always, constitute good financial business reason to fire. 13 I think this is not quite
right. First, given the notoriously short attention spans of people involved in Twitter trials,14
it is difficult to conclude that continued employment of the person who is the subject of the
Twitter trial will be too economically burdensome. It is not obvious that the Twitter trial
participants are motivated or influential enough to harm the business, especially when the
business has a customer base that does not overlap with those participating in the Twitter
trial.
Second, firing someone often means that the business must replace the fired person
in question. There can be significant costs involved in finding a replacement candidate and
training the newly hired employee. 15 Until a suitable candidate is hired and trained, others in
the workplace may need to pick up the slack, as it were, and this might adversely affect their
productivity. These are non-trivial costs that may ultimately outweigh the costs of continuing

Alternatively, if it is wrong to fire an employee for these more serious cases, it may be for different kinds of
reasons than the reasons I am offering.
13 Whether a Twitter trial imposes a significant economic burden will of course ultimately turn on empirical
investigation.
14 Ronson, So You’ve Been Publicly Shamed, 2015, 79.
15 Arindrajit Dube, Eric Freeman, and Michael Reich, “Employee Replacement Costs,” Institute for Research on
Labor and Employment, 2010.
12
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to employ the subject of the Twitter trial.16 By hypothesis, the employer knows the subject
of the Twitter trial to be a productive employee.17
Most importantly, even if it is fanciful to omit cases that bring about serious
disruption to the traditional economic aims of business, clarifying the sort of cases I am
considering will be an important first step toward making progress on the more difficult
question of how businesses should act when there are significant economic harms or
disruptions resulting from an employee’s outside of work immoral conduct.
Despite these qualifications, I am not merely considering a narrow set of cases.
Examples of cases permitted within my analysis include drunkenly berating someone,
participating in a swingers’ club, using marijuana, purchasing a kidney, undergoing an
abortion, making an off-color joke, cheating on one’s spouse, and so on. 18 To be clear, in
this dissertation I will not take a stance on whether these cases in fact constitute immoral
conduct. Instead, I will argue that even if we suppose all the cases I have mentioned involve
immoral acts, or alternatively, if the manager thinks (perhaps contrary to fact) these acts
constitute immoral acts, the manager nevertheless has strong moral reason not to fire the
employee when such conduct done outside of the workplace gives rise to a Twitter trial.

One complexity I have bracketed is how to handle those who are leading the firm. For example, we might
think that if the employee who is at the center of a Twitter trial is the chief executive officer, this should merit a
different kind of response.
17 In the context of employment protection from wrongful dismissal more generally, recent studies indicate
there might be positive, innovation-related, benefits to employment protection through wrongful discharge
laws. See Viral V Acharya, Ramin P Baghai, and Krishnamurthy V Subramanian, “Wrongful Discharge Laws
and Innovation,” Review of Financial Studies 27, no. 1 (2014): 301–46. For other economic benefits related to
employment protection, see Florian Baumann, “On Unobserved Worker Heterogeneity and Employment
Protection,” European Journal of Law and Economics 29, no. 2 (2010): 155–75.
18 We might also think that the means through which the person’s immoral conduct comes to light matters.
Specifically, if the person volunteered the information in a public forum rather than if the person’s conduct
came to light due to being covertly taped, or being eavesdropped on, this may be of moral significance.
16
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Some cases I include in my analysis are widely agreed to be immoral, while there is
significant disagreement about others, and still others seem morally ambiguous. It is worth
noting the diversity and range of these cases. For instance, many agree adultery is wrong. In
the debate surrounding abortion, there is significant disagreement, but depending on which
side of the disagreement one falls, the conduct is considered seriously immoral—that is,
many of those who think abortion is wrong think it is seriously wrong, and those who think
that it is permissible, often think that it is a very minor wrong, if even a wrong at all. Using
marijuana is illegal in certain jurisdictions, but it is much less clear that its use is immoral.
Making an off-color joke might be thought to be morally ambiguous. So, despite the cases I
have excluded, there are plenty of interesting cases that are permitted in my analysis.19
Some might take issue with the very question I am investigating. Specifically, one
might object that insofar as there is a presumption of employment at-will, someone running
a business can fire an employee for whatever reason or even no reason. Asking what justifies
a particular instance of firing is simply out of place and confused.
Even if we suppose a manager has a legal right to fire an employee in the way EAW
permits, there are better and worse ways in which the manager can exercise this right.
Consider the following example:

I am concerned with firing someone in a context in which this is the first time such conduct has been
brought to the employer’s attention. There are interesting issues that arise with respect to how we ought to
treat repeat offenders (as well as unapologetic offenders), and whether we can justify treating them more
harshly than first-time offenders (or apologetic offenders). This raises additional complications, so for the
purposes of clarity, I assume this is the first time the alleged wrongdoing has been brought to the employer’s
attention. My attention was first drawn to this issue in footnote number seven in Douglas N Husak, “Already
Punished Enough,” Philosophical Topics 18, no. 1 (1990): 79–99.
19

9

Campus Recruiter: Suppose a manager participates in a campus job fair and hires
fifteen bright-eyed undergraduates. Unbeknownst to the candidates, the manager has
hired these individuals only for the pleasure of firing them the next day.
The manager’s exercise of EAW is not plausibly well-justified. Insofar as there are better and
worse ways in which one can exercise EAW, this is what I minimally need for the question I
am exploring to get off the ground.
Some might think it is obvious why an employer might want to fire an employee
who has acted immorally. So, the pertinent question is: Why shouldn’t the business fire the
employee? In interpersonal morality, if I learn that an acquaintance has a habit of making
off-color jokes, surely I am justified in not inviting this person to my next cocktail party—
“because I do not want that sort of person at my party” (call this reason the “preference to
disassociate,” or “PTD”) is reason enough. The observation concerning interpersonal
morality seems, at least in part, to be correct.20
There are several possible explanations for why the PTD may not justify firing an
employee for outside of work immoral conduct. First, perhaps the business owes it to the
employee to keep him or her on as a matter of some sort of relational obligation.
Alternatively, the employee might have a right to employment, or some other sort of moral
protection, such as a property right to his or her job. While these are interesting responses,
these are not my concerns in this dissertation, and I will remain agnostic as to these
possibilities.

Perhaps if one has a close relationship with another and suddenly decides to disassociate, even if one does
not owe it to the friend, it might be good, morally speaking, to indicate to the friend why one is distancing
oneself.
20
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I argue that one’s PTD does not justify firing an employee at the center of a Twitter
trial because the manager’s preference not to have such a person in the workplace does not
permit the manager to act inappropriately. When I use “inappropriate,” I mean that there is
strong moral reason weighing against the act. In the remainder of the dissertation, I argue
that the manager acts inappropriately when he or she fires someone for acting immorally
outside the workplace. Specifically, I argue that when a manager fires an employee at the
center of a Twitter trial, the manager is blaming inappropriately. So, rather than arguing for a
right to employment or a property right in one’s work, my arguments for why the manager
should not fire the employee are grounded in interpersonal morality, specifically, the ethics
of blame.

The Badness of Being Fired
I will briefly discuss the significance of work and the badness of getting fired.
Though I suspect this section will not be especially controversial, it is important to keep at
the front of one’s mind the seriousness of the issue.
Firing an employee can be a decision of significant consequence. In the United
States, for many people, their work is rightly or wrongly inextricably linked to their sense of
self or “identity,” so to speak. It is not uncommon that the first question one asks upon
meeting another is, “What do you do?” The structure of the response is telling: “I am an
accountant”, “I am a banker”, “I am a doctor”, and so on. Besides the obvious benefits of
income providing for food and shelter for oneself and one’s family, work is often an
important source of one’s community and friends. One’s social standing is also often linked
11

to his or her work; students at universities acquire elevated social status for obtaining
employment at certain companies rather than others. People also spend a significant portion
of their adult waking hours at work, so even if one’s work is not especially important to
oneself, it still occupies a significant portion of one’s life.
Given the importance of work, not surprisingly, getting fired has serious
implications. Beyond the obvious loss of income (which is not a trivial matter), extensive
evidence points to the negative psychological (and sometimes physical) impact of being
unemployed, losing one’s job, or being fired. 21 For many, job loss is among their biggest
fears and it is also accompanied by a perception of a serious hit to self-worth. It can take
months to recover emotionally from job loss. Many terminated employees also experience
various detrimental physical symptoms such as “chest pains, headaches and panic attacks.”22
But job loss does not merely impact the person who has lost her job—it affects her relations
as well. There are serious negative effects on relationships and marriages, including increases
in extramarital affairs, alcoholism, and domestic violence.
The consequences of being fired for immoral conduct (as opposed to being fired for
economic reasons pertaining to the firm’s financial health) are especially significant. That is,
when one is fired due to immoral conduct, it can increase the difficulty of securing new
employment. A person who is fired for immoral conduct will need to offer a credible and
persuasive explanation to any prospective employers for why one’s firing should not be held

J.M. Ivancevich and M.T. Matteson, Stress and Work: A Managerial Perspective, Management Applications Series
(Scott, Foresman, 1980); J.C. Quick and J.D. Quick, Organizational Stress and Preventive Management, Management
Series (McGraw-Hill, 1984); Stefanie P Spera, Eric D Buhrfeind, and James W Pennebaker, “Expressive
Writing and Coping with Job Loss,” Academy of Management Journal 37, no. 3 (1994): 722–33.
22 Jada Graves, “The Psychology of Being Fired - US News,” April 17, 2014,
http://money.usnews.com/money/careers/articles/2014/04/17/the-psychology-of-being-fired.
21
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against oneself—one is on the defensive from the very start of the job search. Also, the
person fired likely loses her former employer as a reference.23
Moreover, there are also psychological biases that may make prospective employers
less inclined to hire the person who was fired. For instance, the “just-world fallacy” is a
cognitive bias that causes people to think that the bad things that occur to someone must
have been deserved due to some previous untoward behavior on his or her part. As such,
the “just-world fallacy” may cause people to think that someone who was fired got what he
deserved (even if it was in fact unjustified and undeserved). This makes the consequences
due to being fired for allegedly immoral conduct much more severe since certain cognitive
biases may increase a prospective employer’s cautiousness with regard to giving an
opportunity to someone who was fired.

Overview of Chapters

I will now offer a brief chapter-by-chapter overview of the arguments that follow.
Chapter 2, entitled “Employment At-Will: A Misguided Debate,” explores some influential
arguments that aim to criticize employment at-will (EAW), the legal presumption that an
employer can terminate an employee for good reason, bad reason, or no reason, and with or
without warning (similarly, an employee can quit with or without reason and with or without

For a discussion concerning the effects of the perception of procedural justice with regard to how employees
come to terms with dismissal see Brockner et al., 1994. For an analysis of the connection between the
psychological aspects of the employer-employee relationship and its relation to the quantity of wrongful
termination complaints, see Lind, Greenberg, Scott, & Welchans, 2000.
23

13

warning).24 The position I defend is that the debate surrounding the issue of EAW has to a
great extent involved the two sides in the debate talking past each other. Defenders of EAW
argue that governments should not implement laws to regulate employment practices (e.g.,
through requiring procedural due process prior to the dismissal of an employee or through
requiring a just cause for dismissal).25 Opponents of EAW have been arguing that having
EAW allows for the immoral treatment of employees. I claim that one can simultaneously
accept the claims that both parties are making, and as such, that this counts as good evidence
that the two sides in the debate are talking about different matters (even if they do not see
themselves as doing so). I conclude this chapter by stating how my view in this dissertation
fits into the discussion surrounding EAW.
In Chapter 3, I argue for the claim that a manager firing an employee in response to
the employee’s immoral conduct that gives rise to a Twitter trial constitutes an expression of
blame. While mobs, witch-hunts, and other forms of communal responses to transgressions
of morality are familiar, Twitter trials have several unique dimensions that are morally
significant: (1) anyone with an internet connection (at the time of writing, this is estimated at
3.2 billion people) can participate in the Twitter trial, (2) it takes minimal effort to participate
in the Twitter trial (e.g., it is as easy as pressing “like” on Facebook), (3) there is little
accountability for participating in the Twitter trial, (4) after the Twitter trial occurs, there is
often a permanent, public, and visible record of the Twitter trial, and (5) a full scale Twitter
trial can occur within mere minutes, requiring little in terms of coordination and effort due
Werhane, Radin, and Bowie, Employment and Employee Rights; McCall, “A Defense of Just Cause Dismissal
Rules.”
25 Richard A Epstein, “In Defense of the Contract at Will,” The University of Chicago Law Review 51, no. 4 (1984):
947–82; Ian Maitland, “Rights in the Workplace: A Nozickian Argument,” Journal of Business Ethics 8, no. 12
(1989): 951–54.
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to the nature of social networks.26 The fact that most employers are included within (1) has
significance for our investigation—the Twitter trial will undoubtedly be brought to the
attention of the employer, either intentionally (e.g., the employer is “tagged” in a post) or
otherwise.
Sometimes the conduct for which a Twitter trial erupts is undoubtedly immoral.
Other times, it is less clear. There are several scenarios regarding the manager’s view of the
employee’s action: (a) the manager thinks the conduct is immoral, but it is not, (b) the
participants think it is immoral, but the manager does not, and it is not immoral, or (c) both
the participants and the manager think it is immoral and it is in fact immoral. These are all
distinct possibilities that might give rise to distinct normative issues that turn on the moral
significance of the “subjective ought.” In the course of the dissertation I assume (a) or (c).
My view is that firing in response to immoral conduct that generates a Twitter trial
constitutes an expression of blame—the firing claim. I first discuss how I understand the
concept of blame and then claim that firing in response to a Twitter trial constitutes an
expression of blame. I then engage with the objection that firing is not really blaming; rather,
the business is merely disassociating. I argue for an important distinction between agentrelative expressions and agent-neutral expressions. I claim firings in Twitter trial contexts express
blame in the agent-neutral sense of expression, and this kind of expression is intent
In the weeks that followed Sacco’s tweet, she had to shorten her stay with her family in South Africa because
employees of the hotel she was lodged in threatened to riot and authorities told her that they could not
guarantee her safety. Once she returned to New York, journalists were assigned to follow her around the city.
Others took it upon themselves to place Sacco’s life prior to the tweet under a microscope, including
unearthing her past social media activity from years and months prior, in order to spotlight other unfortunate
tweets. It is worth noting that Sacco was previously an unknown PR person with 170 followers on Twitter.
Relatively speaking, she had an insignificant social media presence and was not a public figure. One reason it
went viral was that a Gawker journalist, Sam Biddle, retweeted Justine’s tweet to his 15,000 followers, thereby
setting off the chain reaction that generated the Twitter trial. For more on this, see Jon Ronson, So You’ve Been
Publicly Shamed (Picador, 2015).
26
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insensitive. So, whether the business was blaming does not always depend on whether the
business’s intention was to blame.
In Chapters 4 and 5, I argue that not only is firing in response to a Twitter trial an act
of blame, but that it is an inappropriate act of blame. These chapters present the argument
for that further claim. In making this argument I claim that we must pay attention to the fact
that blaming is a communal practice. This is where the additivity principle comes in. The
communal dimensions of blame make it such that considering the proportionality of an act
of blame as individuals is not enough; we need to consider the extent to which others in the
community are blaming. Not doing so can result in one’s act of blame being inappropriate.
Some theorists speak of there being “an arc of normative current passing between”
members of the moral community.27 But sometimes, in our responses to wrongdoing, we act
as though we are the only channel of normative current and fail to consider that what we
ought to do will depend on the fact that many others are connected in this same way. This
failure is magnified in Twitter trial scenarios.

Michael Thompson, “What Is It to Wrong Someone? A Puzzle about Justice,” in Reason and Value, ed. R. Jay
Wallace, Samuel Scheffler, and Michael Smith (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), 335. This citation is
due to Nicolas Cornell, “Wrongs, Rights, and Third Parties,” Philosophy & Public Affairs 43, no. 2 (2015): 110.
27
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CHAPTER 2: EMPLOYMENT AT-WILL: A MISGUIDED DEBATE
Introduction
Many employees in the United States believe that they cannot be fired without good
reason.28 This is a flagrant misperception. In the United States, employment relations are
presumed to be “at-will”—that is, an employee can be fired for good reason, bad reason, or
no reason, and with or without warning (similarly, employees can quit for good reason, bad
reason, or no reason and with or without warning). 29 So, employment is largely unprotected
(except for the constitutionally protected classes and a few prohibitions that vary from stateto-state) in the United States, and not only does an employer not need a just cause to
terminate an employee, but also an employer need not have a cause at all.30
In this chapter, I defend the claim that the debate surrounding employment at-will
(EAW) has been misguided. Specifically, I claim that the two sides in the debate have been
talking past each other. To be clear, I am not claiming that the participants in the debate see
themselves as talking past each other; rather, I claim that their arguments do not entail
contradictory theses. I focus on some philosophical arguments that critics of EAW offer and
Pauline T Kim, “Bargaining With Imperfect Information: A Study of Worker Perceptions of Legal
Protection in an At-Will World,” Cornell Law Review 83 (1997): 105–60.
29 Many nations do not presume employment at-will. Much of Europe mandates a just cause for dismissal and
extensive procedural due process.
30 The road to the presumption of employment at-will was paved relatively recently. The first mention of
employment at-will was in Horace Gray Wood, A Treatise on the Law of Master and Servant: Covering the Relation,
Duties and Liabilities of Employers and Employees (JD Parsons, jr., 1877). Wood observed a pattern among past
court rulings on employment relations that seemed to him well-captured as “at-will.” As it turns out, rather
than considering Wood’s observation as simply describing a pattern in past rulings, his work ended up serving
as justification for future employment decisions and paved the way for EAW to secure its status as a deeply
entrenched default legal rule in the United States. Wood’s observation ended up gaining justificatory force once
the prestigious New York Court of Appeals acknowledged his view as the authoritative understanding of
employment relations in Martin v. New York Life Ins. Co. (1895). Thus, an observation about past cases,
combined with a misinterpretation about that observation having normative force for how to understand
employment relations, resulted in employment at-will having immense influence on the structure of
employment relations in the United States.
28
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suggest that these arguments fail to target what defenders of EAW are concerned with. My
broader aim in this chapter is to diagnose the state of the debate and ultimately to clarify
where this dissertation fits into the EAW conversation.

The Overview of the Questions Related to Employment At-Will
There are at least four questions at issue in the debate regarding EAW:
a) Should it be legally permissible for an employer to terminate an employee for bad
reason or no reason and without warning?
b) Should it be legally permissible for an employee to terminate the employment
relation for bad reason or no reason and with or without warning?
c) Would it be wrong for a business to terminate an employee (without reason, or for
arbitrary or bad reason and without warning)?
d) Would it be wrong for an employee to leave a firm (without reason, or for
arbitrary or bad reason and without warning)?

Defenders of EAW answer (a) and (b) affirmatively and do not speak to (c) or (d). 31 Critics
of EAW answer (c) affirmatively, and some seem to even affirm (d). 32 It is unclear where
critics of EAW stand regarding how to answer (b). One aim of this chapter is to argue that
critics of EAW go astray by using arguments marshalled in service of an affirmative answer
to (c), to attack an affirmative answer to (a).
Now—here is the critical question for the critics of EAW—is the source of the
worry with EAW what it legally allows for or what it morally allows for? If it is the former,
critics of EAW need more significant and targeted arguments—in particular, it may require
31
32

Epstein, “In Defense of the Contract at Will.”
Werhane, Radin, and Bowie, Employment and Employee Rights.
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arguments concerning political authority and why it ought to be exercised in certain specific
ways (such as legally mandating a just cause and due process for employment terminations)
with respect to employment relations. In other words, they must address the question
Richard Epstein, a prominent defender of EAW, poses: “If government regulation is
inappropriate for personal, religious, or political activities, then what makes it intrinsically
desirable for employment relations?”33 If, however, it is the latter, then critics of EAW have
needlessly worried themselves, because defenders of EAW are not arguing for claims about
how the manager morally ought to treat her employees.
My claim that the two sides in the debate are arguing past each other is based on the
following. When arguments “talk to each other,” one argument’s premises entail that P and
the opposing argument’s premises entail that ~P. When arguments “talk past each other,”
one argument’s premises entail that P and the other argument’s premises entail that Q. I
suggest, in the EAW debate, defenders of EAW have been making arguments for the
conclusion that P, but critics of EAW have been arguing for the conclusion that Q. While I
am open to the possibility that critics of EAW see themselves as making arguments for the
conclusion that ~P, I aim to show that one can simultaneously endorse the conjunction of
the conclusions of both sides in the debate (that is, one can simultaneously accept both that
P and that Q).
Here is how I proceed. I will consider three arguments that critics of EAW offer: (1)
the arbitrary treatment argument, (2) the managerial analogical argument, and (3) the “even
in principle problematic” class of arguments. I will argue that all three of these arguments

33

“In Defense of the Contract at Will,” 954.
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share the same two flaws: (i) they are arguments that entail a moral thesis that few would
disagree with, and (ii) the premises in these arguments for the moral thesis entail no further
conclusion about why it would be wrong for EAW to be a legally permissible presumption.
While the moral thesis critics of EAW have argued for may ultimately also serve as an
intermediate conclusion in an argument for the wrongness of the legal permissibility of
EAW, the further premises that take us from such an intermediate conclusion to the desired
final conclusion are absent in their present arguments.

Arguments Against Employment At-Will

The Arbitrary Treatment Argument
In Patricia Werhane et al.’s influential view, the problem with EAW is that employers
can treat employees in an arbitrary manner, and this is at odds with how persons should be
treated—that is, with respect. They state,
“Ordinarily, companies give reasons, usually good economic reasons, for layoffs and
dismissals. EAW, however, permits arbitrary layoffs, and this leeway is problematic.
When I get rid of a robot, I do not have to give reasons, because a robot is not a
rational being. It has no emotions and no use for reasons. On the other hand, people
do reason and feel, and they feel an entire range of emotions. If I fire a person
arbitrarily, I am making the assumption that he or she does not need reasons. But if I
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have hired people, then, in firing them, I should treat them as such, with respect,
throughout the termination process.”34
This is an important position in the debate. It is worth examining this and related arguments
that aim to target EAW. I will claim that these arguments miss the mark with respect to
answering either (a) (Should it be legally permissible for an employer to terminate an employee for bad
reason or no reason and without warning?) or (b) (Should it be legally permissible for an employee to
terminate the employment relation for bad reason or no reason and without warning?) in our list of four
questions.
Werhane et al. claim that the arbitrary treatment of employees is wrong, because it is
disrespectful. While this claim is independently plausible, it does not address the legal
presumption of EAW; rather, it is a claim about how businesses ought not to treat their
employees. Philosopher John McCall appears to make a similar point as Werhane et al.:
“Terminating a person’s employment for no reason or for purely personal reasons is the
epitome of arbitrary treatment.”35 Again, this seems plausible. But to my knowledge, few
defenders of EAW suggest that managers should terminate an employee for no reason or
purely personal reasons.
Importantly, even if we grant that treating employees arbitrarily is wrong, it does not
follow that there ought to be a legal regime in place to prevent this kind of wrongful
behavior. So, the argument that firing an employee arbitrarily disrespects that employee is
plausible, but it does not license any conclusions about whether such treatment of employees
ought to be legally impermissible.
34
35

Werhane, Radin, and Bowie, Employment and Employee Rights, 70.
“A Defense of Just Cause Dismissal Rules,” 167.
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The Managerial Analogical Argument
Werhane et al. criticize EAW by drawing a parallel to other aspects of managing a
business:
“…EAW permits inconsistent, even irrational, management behavior by permitting
arbitrary, not work-related, treatment of employees—behavior that is not considered
a good management practice…Since arbitrary accounting, marketing, and investment
practices are not tolerated, arbitrary human resource practice should be considered
equally questionable”36
Suppose Werhane et al. are correct to point out that arbitrary accounting and marketing
practices are not considered appropriate and are not tolerated. What follows?
The managerial analogical argument amounts to the following: if people do not do X
in situation Y, and if situation Z is sufficiently analogous to Y, then people should not do X
in Z either. The argument goes, since in marketing (or other areas of business) managers do
not make decisions arbitrarily, neither should they do so in employment. Even if consistency
is of moral significance, there is a problem with the analogical argument. One way to object
is to deny the analogy (for example, by claiming that marketing and accounting are not
analogous in certain morally relevant ways to the employment realm). I will not pursue this
route. A second way to object—and the route I pursue—is to suggest that whatever
inconsistency that Werhane et al. claim is present between employment and other areas in
management is merely apparent; thus, the analogical argument lacks normative force.

36

Werhane, Radin, and Bowie, Employment and Employee Rights, 197.
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Let’s first disambiguate the issues at stake in the claim that arbitrary treatment is not
tolerated in other areas of management. Answering this will turn on a conceptual question
and an empirical question: the conceptual question is, what do Werhane et al. mean by
“tolerated,” and once we settle that, we can move to the empirical question of, is arbitrary
treatment not tolerated in other areas of managing a business?
Suppose by “not tolerated” Werhane et al. mean that it is not morally acceptable. Let’s
suppose that on such an understanding of “not tolerated,” it is correct that arbitrary
practices are not tolerated in other areas of management. Given this understanding of “not
tolerated” and the assumption that it is in fact not morally acceptable in other domains of
business, Werhane et al. make an analogical argument that derives its force from the
conditional claim that, since arbitrary treatment is not tolerated in other parts of management,
it should not be tolerated with respect to employment decisions either. But this argument
does not get us too far, because its conclusion is trivial; few would deny it. That is, on the
assumption that “not tolerated” means not morally acceptable, few would deny that treating
someone arbitrarily in employment is not tolerated.
On the other hand, if what Werhane et al. mean in saying that arbitrary treatment is
“not tolerated” in other domains of business is that it is not legally permissible to make
arbitrary decisions, then the claim is false. It is legally permissible for a manager to act
arbitrarily with respect to switching suppliers or changing a marketing campaign—the reason
might be as arbitrary as not liking one’s cappuccino that morning. The legal prohibition
against arbitrary behavior in other domains of management is just as it is in the employment
context (that is, there is no prohibition against it!)—marketing is indeed “at-will” in the
23

relevant sense; a manager can change, remove, or alter a marketing campaign with or without
good reason at any point. A marketing manager’s right to do so would be legally tolerated,
despite it perhaps being managerially unwise and morally unacceptable.
Perhaps a more charitable understanding of Werhane et al.’s worry is that EAW
supports arbitrary treatment of employees and does so in a way that “supplier at-will” or other
business relations do not, and this discrepancy should not be legally tolerated. They state,
“…EAW supports inconsistent and even irrational management behavior by permitting
arbitrary treatment of employees, behavior that is not tolerated as best management
practice.”37 However, if by “supports” they mean EAW encourages arbitrary treatment, this
is false, and they too are aware of this. They state, “EAW is a default rule, not a guiding
principle. In other words, while EAW allows employers and employees to behave arbitrarily,
it does not necessarily encourage it.”38 Not only does EAW not “necessarily encourage it,” it
doesn’t even contingently encourage arbitrary treatment; this is because there is little (if any)
action guiding content to EAW.
Thus, if the target of the “managerial analogical argument” are those who answer (a)
affirmatively (it should be legally permissible for an employer to terminate an employee for bad reason or no
reason and without warning), there is no inconsistency between employment and other domains
of business. Thus, the argument loses its force with respect to the value of consistency. If on
the other hand, the target is those who answer (c) negatively (it is not morally wrong for a business
to terminate an employee without reason, or for arbitrary or bad reason), then the argument is trivial—
few hold this view, and defenders of EAW take no stance with respect to it.
37
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The “Even in Principle Problematic” Class of Arguments
Still, perhaps we have moved too fast in suggesting the arguments against EAW miss
their target. We can first, for the sake of argument, assume the government can justifiably
use its authority (contra political anarchist positions). Then the question becomes not a
question of political authority, broadly speaking, whether coercive use of the law is
permissible by governments, but whether the coercive force of the law is permissible within
employment relations.
This question has been answered affirmatively with respect to certain areas in
employment, namely, the constitutionally protected classes. So, the question of whether the
government ought to have a say with respect to employment decisions has been answered in
the affirmative by the law, and again, I will assume this is justified.
Given there is (by hypothesis) justification for government intervention with respect
to some subset of employment decisions (that results in omitting a subset of reasons from
counting as legally permissible justifications for termination), let’s briefly look to some
arguments for why this government intervention might extend further, for example, to
require procedural due process and a just cause for dismissal.39
Philosopher John McCall argues, “Given the unavoidable and central role that
employment plays in contemporary life, a policy that allows employers to demand everIdentifying whether there is a just cause for a termination is a thorny matter. On one particularly influential
formulation of what constitutes a just cause, it involves the following seven tests: “(1) Employee was
forewarned of consequences of his actions; (2) company’s rules are reasonably related to business efficiency
and performance employer might expect from employee; (3) effort was made before discharge to determine
whether employee was guilty as charged; (4) investigation was conducted fairly and objectively; (5) substantial
evidence of employee’s guilt was obtained; (6) rules were applied fairly and without discrimination; and (7)
degree of discipline was reasonably related to seriousness of employee’s offense and employee’s past record.”
Carroll Daugherty, Enterprise Wire Co., No. 359 (LA March 28, 1966).
39
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increasing productivity under threat of dismissal is an unreasonable policy.” 40 But this
argument moves too fast; we need to distinguish between the ability to terminate
employment from threatening to terminate employment.
Consider an example in a different context: If I am in a romantic relationship, I have
the ability to break up. But this ability does not entail that I am threatening to break up.
While employment relations and romantic relations are normatively distinct kinds of
relations, the point is merely that the fact that an employer can terminate the relationship
does not entail that the employer is threatening to terminate it (relatedly, merely because an
employee has the ability to terminate the employment relationship, it would be odd to think
that the employee is threatening to quit). Possessing the ability to terminate the employment
relationship does not entail that those in the relationship are “under threat of dismissal.”
There still may remain a more promising option for taking EAW head-on. Perhaps
Werhane et al.’s claim should be understood as defending the view that it is wrong to have a
legal system that even in principle allows people to treat others in an arbitrary manner.41 This is
the argument that it would be wrong to leave open the possibility for firms to treat
employees arbitrarily—even if no one ever did so—without legal consequence, and thus
there should be mandatory procedural due process and just cause requirements. However,
the claim that the mere possibility of arbitrary treatment should be legally closed off is
peculiar. Consider the following:

McCall, “A Defense of Just Cause Dismissal Rules,” 168.
While I think arguing against the principle itself is a promising route, there is some reason to think that this is
not the view that Werhane et al. espouse. This is because they state, “The most telling argument against at-will
employment does not the [sic] question of the principle itself but rather raises issue about its abuses.”
Employment and Employee Rights, 73.
40
41
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Friendship At-Will: The United States subscribes to Friendship At-Will (FAW), the
legal presumption that in a friendship between A and B, A can legally terminate the
friendship for good reason, bad reason, or no reason, and with or without warning.
Similarly, B can do so as well. Some theorists have criticized FAW as allowing for the
possibility of friends to terminate friendships arbitrarily, something that causes a
serious harm (after all, friends invest a great deal of time, trust, and loyalty into the
relationship) and is disrespectful. It has been suggested that the mere possibility of
this is morally problematic and that there should be a just cause requirement for
terminating friendships. Moreover, critics of FAW claim that friendships should not
be terminated without procedural due process.
Some might say that this is a laughable comparison because when a person loses their
employment that person is seriously harmed. But this is so with friendships just as well;
many think friendships constitute an important component of the good life. It is implausible
to think that there ought to be a legal requirement for just cause termination of friendship or
due process. The point is simply that the possibility of arbitrary treatment in a domain is not
sufficient justification for legally prohibiting the possibility of arbitrary treatment in that
domain.
Importantly, it seems plausible that if a friend terminated a friendship for a chance of
winning an iPod shuffle in a raffle, this would be wrong. It also seems plausible that not
providing any explanation for terminating a friendship is wrong—that is, the fact of the
friendship may morally require that a friend should receive an explanation for why the
relationship is being terminated (a sort of informal procedural due process). The same sort
27

of things can be said about how a manager ought to treat her employees. There are many
ways in which a manager might treat an employee immorally, in just the same way as there
are many ways in which a spouse, parent, or friend could treat the person in the relation
immorally. But this possibility alone does not justify regulating these relationships.
In the business context, the mere fact that a manager could arbitrarily terminate her
relationship with a certain supplier need not mean that there ought to be a legal presumption
against doing so. Few are exercised by the fact that we have the presumption of supplier atwill (or other at-will business presumptions). The critical point is that the mere fact that
EAW, in principle, allows for immoral behavior is not sufficient justification to implement a
legal demand for just cause or due process. Importantly, it also does not of course mean that
managers are morally justified in treating people arbitrarily in employment, just as they would
not be in these other kinds of business relations.
Therefore, if Werhane et al. and other critics of EAW claim that it is “morally
mandatory,” or in other words, morally obligatory, for businesses to provide due process
and just cause to an employee, then this is a plausible claim. If this is the claim, I will not
address it further. But if critics of EAW claim that morality requires it to be legally
mandatory to provide procedural due process and a just cause, their arguments cannot
withstand the weight of such a thesis.
One point I have not yet touched on is the question of symmetry in the employment
relation. Tara Radin and Patricia Werhane seem to think that just as managers ought to give

28

good reasons for termination, employees also should give good reasons. 42 They however
leave a critical bit unstated: Specifically, they do not say if employees should be legally
mandated to provide good reasons to terminate the employment relation. It is already
something of a norm for employees to provide two weeks’ notice, and insofar as the
employee has any kind of relationship with her immediate higher up, she may even offer an
explanation for her departure. But sometimes, an employee can justifiably leave without an
explanation: “I just want to stop working here” seems reason enough. But Werhane et al.
would not think that “I just don’t want you to work here” is reason enough with respect to
firing an employee. So, I suspect it may be worth treating the employment relation
asymmetrically, even as a moral matter. Conflating the legal and the moral question prevents
one from noting such a point.

Concluding Remarks
Many criticisms of EAW are not well-tailored to the employment relation and
highlight little that is unique about what the employment relation requires, regarding either
morality or the law. Indeed some of the critics’ arguments can be put in such a way that they
would make no reference to the employment relation. Not treating people arbitrarily or
unfairly is part and parcel of what we take morality to demand, of managers, but also of
people more generally.
The defenders of employment at-will argue that the government should not
intervene in structuring employment relations. Opponents of employment at-will claim that
Tara J Radin and Patricia H. Werhane, “Employment-at-Will, Employee Rights, and Future Directions for
Employment,” Business Ethics Quarterly 13, no. 2 (2003): 115.
42

29

what employment at-will allows for is immoral. What has happened is that one can
simultaneously endorse the claims of defenders and opponents of EAW. This is evidence for
the claim that the subject matter at hand is different.
McCall outlines the difference between an EAW regime and one that espouses a Just
Cause dismissal regime (as in several European countries).
“Recall that both Just Cause and EAW allow dismissal on grounds of inadequate
performance, theft, absenteeism, etc. There are, though, at least three main scenarios
where Just Cause is more restrictive than EAW. These are its prohibitions on
dismissal for no reason, for personal reasons that are unrelated to productivity, and
for the reason that there is a more productive replacement available for a currently
adequate employee”43
Important for my point is that insofar as the prohibitions under Just Cause are things
employers morally should not do, a person who endorses the legal presumption of EAW can
agree that a manager should not, morally speaking, do those things.
The arguments in favor of EAW justify a claim about what governments can (or
cannot) justifiably mandate. This is seen from the fact that defenders of EAW contrast their
subject of concern from non-legal approaches. For instance,

43

McCall, “A Defense of Just Cause Dismissal Rules,” 166.

30

“The critics of the contract at will all point out imperfections in the current
institutional arrangements, but they do not take into account the nonlegal means of
preserving long-term employment relationships”44
Perhaps an even more telling point in favor of the claim that EAW defenders are not
concerned with the possibility of immoral conduct is that some influential statements of the
presumption of EAW have morally wrong reasons built into the statement: “All may dismiss
their employees at will, be they many or few, for good cause, for no cause[,] or even for
cause morally wrong, without being thereby guilty of legal wrong.”45 While some academic
debates involve deep and substantive disagreements, I do not think the debate around EAW
has been such a debate. Instead, the debate surrounding EAW has involved talking past each
other due to conflating the legal and the moral realms.
An upshot of all of this might be that the arguments business ethicists and
philosophers have developed against EAW are successful with respect to how a manager
should act independent of the presence of EAW as a legal presumption—this is important
and tells us more about what morality requires of a manager.
The view I defend in the broader dissertation concerns the morality of certain
managerial actions. I will grant that there is a legal right to fire grounded in the presumption
of EAW. But we still can say that there are better and worse ways in which one can exercise
this right. In this dissertation, I am not interested in the debate of whether we should have a
different legal regime for employment. Nor am I interested in outlining what EAW legally
allows for. This is because many other “at-will” legal presumptions, e.g., friendships,
44
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suppliers, and romances, legally allow for morally reprehensible treatment of other persons.
The questions that are interesting are specific first order moral questions about the sorts of
things managers should or should not use their termination power over.
I will argue certain employment decisions often perceived by managers to be morally
justified—indeed decisions that firms often take pains to announce—are in fact not morally
justified, namely, firing someone for their outside of work immoral conduct in certain
contexts. I will argue that we should slow down before offering our moral endorsement for
such firings, even if we think such firings ought to be legally permissible. My view concerns
the moral scope of what a manager can do and I am narrowing that scope to exclude certain
acts (i.e., firings) in certain contexts (i.e., Twitter trials), sometimes thought to fall within its
scope.
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CHAPTER 3: ACTS AS EXPRESSIONS: BLAMING THROUGH
FIRING
Introduction
Many acts of firing are not acts of blaming. 46 Firing an employee because one can no
longer afford to pay her salary or because she has become redundant, and so on, are not acts
of blame. But in some circumstances, firing is an act of blame. Specifically, in my view, when
a business fires an employee in response to allegedly immoral conduct that gives rise to a
Twitter trial, this constitutes a form of blame.47 The act of firing is, as usual, the act of
terminating the employment contract, but it also is an act that expresses blame.
Supporting the contention that firing in response to a Twitter trial constitutes an
expression of blame is the purpose of this chapter. To be clear, I will not be offering a
positive argument for this claim, but will instead defend it against some significant worries
and offer some considerations that show that the claim is intelligible and plausible. Lastly,
my aim for now is not to argue that the firing in Twitter trial contexts is an inappropriate,
unjustified, or a wrongful expression of blame, but rather merely to defend the claim that it

Here I am concerned with moral blame. The term “blame” might also be used in contexts where one is
referring to mere causal responsibility—for example, “John claimed his flat tire is to blame for his tardiness.” I
am not concerned with mere causal responsibility.
47 Some might find it perplexing, namely those who espouse a reactive attitudes account of blame, to say that
the business is blaming. (For a sophisticated contemporary defense of a reactive attitudes account of blame, see
R Jay Wallace, Responsibility and the Moral Sentiments (Harvard University Press, 1994).) The argument might be:
Businesses don’t have emotions, so how could they respond through reactive attitudes that constitute blame? I
will not enter into the debate concerning group agency (see, for example, Peter A. French, “The Corporation as
a Moral Person,” American Philosophical Quarterly 16, no. 3 (1979): 207–15; Philip Pettit, “Responsibility
Incorporated,” Ethics 117, no. 2 (2007): 171–201; Manuel Velasquez, “Debunking Corporate Moral
Responsibility,” Business Ethics Quarterly 13, no. 4 (2003): 531–62; Manuel Velasquez, “Why Corporations Are
Not Morally Responsible for Anything They Do,” Business & Professional Ethics Journal 2, no. 3 (1983): 1–18).
When I use the term “business,” insofar as one is opposed to the idea of group agency, it should be understood
merely as a placeholder for the human agent who authorizes the decision to fire.
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is an expression of blame. (The argument for why it is an inappropriate expression of blame
will follow this chapter.)

Preliminary Remarks
First, I will clarify some terminology. Some distinguish between two forms of
employment terminations initiated by the employer: firings and layoffs. People who
distinguish between firings and layoffs suggest that firings can be understood as terminating
an employee for a reason that can plausibly be attributed to the employee’s action (e.g.,
malingering), and that layoffs should be understood as termination due to external
circumstances (e.g., an economic downturn, a change in the strategic direction of the firm,
and so on).
In my view, the distinction between layoffs and firings is not a fruitful one. The
suggestion that one is due to the employee and the other is due to external circumstances is
often untenable. If during an economic downturn, the employee was more
skilled/valuable/productive/charismatic, the employee may not have been laid-off; most
layoffs can plausibly be described in a way that still refers to the employee’s behavior or
abilities. As such, I will continue to use “firings,” even if, to some readers’ ears, “layoffs”
might more suitably capture certain involuntary employment relation terminations.
Second, I relay the scope of my discussion. In this chapter, I am not claiming all
firings are acts of blame—often they are not. Nor am I suggesting that firings are the only
means through which a business might express blame. This too is implausible. The claim I
make is strictly that firing in response to immoral conduct that gives rise to a Twitter trial is
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an expression of blame. Furthermore, firing in response to wrongdoing (or alleged
wrongdoing) is an expression of blame in certain contexts, even if the manager is mistaken
about whether the conduct of the employee was immoral or not.
Third, a brief roadmap is in order. I start with a brief discussion of the concept of
blame. Then, I suggest that firing in response to immoral conduct that gives rise to a Twitter
trial counts as an expression of blame. Next, I engage with the objection that the business is
not really seeking to blame the employee; it is merely seeking to disassociate. In engaging with
this objection, I argue that the intention to blame is not a necessary condition for expressing
blame and the presence of an intention to blame is at best a contingent feature of whether
something is an expression of blame. I discuss the work of Elizabeth Anderson and Richard
Pildes in making this argument.48 While addressing the objection that businesses are not
really concerned with blaming, I introduce a distinction between agent-relative expressions and
agent-neutral expressions. I suggest that firing in response to immoral conduct is an agentneutral expression, and this category of expressions is largely intent insensitive.
I conclude by suggesting that even if one is not sympathetic to my defense of the
claim that firing in Twitter trial contexts is an expression of blame, additional independent
reason supports this claim: in Twitter trial contexts, businesses often explicitly communicate
blame.

Elizabeth S Anderson and Richard H Pildes, “Expressive Theories of Law: A General Restatement,”
University of Pennsylvania Law Review 148, no. 5 (2000): 1503–75. For a recent critique of the force of semiotic
objections, see Jason Brennan and Peter Martin Jaworski, “Markets without Symbolic Limits,” Ethics, no. 125
(2015): 1053–77.
48
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The Concept of Blame49
I am concerned with blame expressed through an act that is under our voluntary
control; typically, this involves overt blame.50 Here, I am not concerned with when one
blames another, “in her head,” as it were. I am happy to grant that in response to
wrongdoing, many of us will experience (perhaps involuntarily) blame in the form of anger
or other negative emotions; as Allan Gibbard states, “Anger, it seems will be with us
whatever we decide.”51 This sort of involuntary blame is not my primary focus; my concern
is with when we overtly express blame.52
As for what precisely blame is, there are many conceptions of blame discussed in the
literature.53 Unfortunately, as Michael McKenna aptly states, “Despite the pervasiveness of
the phenomenon in ordinary life, blame is an elusive notion. It is maddeningly hard to nail
down a theory that gets the extension even close to right. This is shown by the diversity of
strikingly different views about its nature.”54 The difficulties associated with theorizing about
blame have even brought some philosophers to abandon the project of providing a

The most prominent recent accounts of the concept of blame are by R. Jay Wallace (an account inspired by
the work of P.F. Strawson), T.M. Scanlon, and George Sher. See, Thomas Scanlon, Moral Dimensions:
Permissibility, Meaning, Blame (Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2008); Wallace, Responsibility and the
Moral Sentiments; Peter F Strawson, “Freedom and Resentment,” Proceedings of the British Academy 48 (1962): 1–25;
R Jay Wallace, Rahul Kumar, and Samuel Freeman, “Dispassionate Opprobrium: On Blame and the Reactive
Sentiments,” in Reasons and Recognition: Essays on the Philosophy of TM Scanlon (Oxford University Press, 2011);
George Sher, In Praise of Blame (New York: Oxford University Press, 2006).
50 Michael McKenna, “Directed Blame and Conversation,” Blame: Its Nature and Norms, edited by D. Justin
Coates and Neal A. Tognazzini. New York: Oxford University Press, 2012, 119–40.
51 Allan Gibbard, Wise Choices, Apt Feelings: A Theory of Normative Judgment (Harvard University Press, 1992), p.
298. This citation is due to Annette C. Baier, “Moralism and Cruelty: Reflections on Hume and Kant,” Ethics
103, no. 3 (1993): p. 438.
52 This is not to say that one voluntarily or overtly intended for blame to be expressed, rather that one
voluntarily or overtly intended to do the act that expressed blame. More on this shortly.
53 One possibility is that the debate surrounding the nature of blame take the form of what David Chalmers
calls a “verbal dispute.” Though perhaps it is not a mere verbal dispute. See David J Chalmers, “Verbal
Disputes,” Philosophical Review 120, no. 4 (2011): 515–66.
54 “Directed Blame and Conversation,” p. 119.
49
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conceptual analysis of blame.55
With that said, I am sympathetic to the thought that “Blame would not be
blame…absent the core emotions of anger, indignation, and resentment (Rosen, Wallace,
Wolf).”56 So, my sympathies lie in an understanding of blame that resembles a broadly
Strawsonian reactive attitudes account in which blame is understood to be a negative
emotional response to another’s wrongdoing.57
Two important features of such an understanding of blame are the following: (1) it
involves the negative reactive attitudes (e.g. resentment or indignation) that bring about in
the recipient some form of unpleasantness (“the normative force of blame—the sting it
putatively ought to have when directed at one who is blameworthy” 58), and (2) there is a
directedness to these attitudes (“…blame includes an attitudinal aspect, where the attitudes
in question have a distinctive content and focus”59). There remains the possibility that, in
some cases, when one blames another, it does not bring about unpleasantness in the blame
recipient—that is, it fails to “sting.” Still, in typical cases, it seems plausible that blame will be
expected to bring about certain unpleasant effects in the blame recipient. This sort of
understanding of blame seems to me to capture much of our folk intuitions surrounding the
concept. In any case, I will not enter deeper into the debate about the concept of blame. It
seems plausible that we can have a productive discussion of the ethics of blame, even if we
do not have a fully worked out account of the concept of blame.
See, Fricker, “What’s the Point of Blame? A Paradigm Based Explanation.”
Victoria McGeer, “Civilizing Blame,” in Blame: Its Nature and Norms, ed. D. Justin Coates and Neal A.
Tognazzini, 2013, 167.
57 Strawson, “Freedom and Resentment.”
58 Michael McKenna, “Directed Blame and Conversation,” in Blame: Its Nature and Norms, ed. D. Justin Coates
and Neal A. Tognazzini, 2012, 121.
59 Wallace, Responsibility and the Moral Sentiments, 75.
55
56

37

Importantly, I am claiming that when a business responds to a Twitter trial by firing
its employee, it is an expression of indignation directed at the wrongdoer in a way that
counts as an act of blame. Some readers might worry that given that the reactive attitudes
account of blame involves certain emotions, if the person blaming through firing is not
experiencing these emotions, it is perplexing how we could call it blame. However, it is a
mistake to think that expressing emotions requires experiencing the emotion. Emotions can
be expressed even if the agent performing the action that is expressing the emotion, is itself
not experiencing the emotion. One can imagine an author of a moving fiction novel
conveying emotion through her words, without having to experience the emotion at the time
of penning her novel, perhaps even without ever having to experience the emotion at all.
Anderson and Pildes offer a different example that emerges from debates in aesthetics: “Not
everything that expresses a state of mind is caused by that state of mind. Musicians can play
music that expresses sadness, without feeling sad themselves. The music they play need not
express their (or anyone’s) sadness: the sadness is in the music itself.”60 So, the
agent/means/medium channeling the expression of the emotion need not have the
phenomenological experience associated with the emotion.
The purpose in this dissertation is not to enter the debate about the concept of
blame. It seems to me plausible that the reactive attitudes conception of blame captures the
phenomenon I am concerned with—namely, an act that expresses indignation in response to
an alleged wrongdoing—and I am most concerned with the ethics of subjecting another to

Elizabeth S Anderson and Richard H Pildes, “Expressive Theories of Law: A General Restatement,”
University of Pennsylvania Law Review 148, no. 5 (2000): 1508.
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this phenomenon. Whether we decide to call this phenomenon “blame” is not my primary
concern.

“The Business is Not Really Blaming” Objection
I am claiming that firing an employee in response to immoral conduct that gives rise
to a Twitter trial is an expression of blame. Some might think that this claim is false. The
thought might go, “businesses are not really trying to blame the employee—they are merely
trying to disassociate.” This objection is important but ultimately mistaken.
It is worth noting that blaming and disassociating are not mutually exclusive. The
manager might intend to blame through disassociating. For instance, the core example in
Christopher Bennett’s “The Varieties of Retributive Experience” is one in which a man’s
colleagues disassociate from him to express blame due to his infidelity toward a mutual
acquaintance.61 In Bennett’s example, the persons disassociating intend for their colleague to
know their disassociating is due to his infidelity.
But suppose the manager disavows the intention to blame. Unlike the colleagues in
Bennett’s example, the manager is only concerned with disassociating and not concerned
with expressing blame. The manager might fire, and never care whether the employee knows
the reason for which she was fired. One might think this should count as prima facie
evidence that the manager was not blaming, but was merely disassociating.
This is a tempting worry. One can indeed imagine a manager firing the employee
without caring about the immoral conduct (perhaps it is strictly a decision in service of
impression management). Perhaps the manager has performed the very same immoral act
61

“The Varieties of Retributive Experience,” Philosophical Quarterly 52, no. 207 (2002).
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many times and simply has not been caught. This objection is worrisome but surmountable.
To do so, we must briefly discuss the nature of the relationship between actions and
expressions. While doing so, I introduce a distinction of significance to our investigation: the
distinction between agent-relative expressions and agent-neutral expressions.

Drawing A Distinction Between Kinds of Expressions
The range of possible expressions is fairly wide and diverse: “People can
express…beliefs…moods, emotions, attitudes, desires, intentions, and personality traits.
They can do so not only through speech and instrumental action, but through gestures, tone
of voice, a shrug may express indifference; a whisper, reverence; a swagger, cockiness; a
song, joy; a sneer, contempt.”62 In the context of the workplace, an act of firing in response
to immoral conduct might express a variety of things too. A firing might express that:
•
•
•

The employee was not valued by the firm.
The firm considers its image more important than protecting its employee.
The firm has a zero-tolerance policy for “shaking the boat.”

On the other hand, the firing might also express that:
•
•
•

The firm stands in solidarity with victims of wrongdoing.
The firm thinks that it has a responsibility to combat unethical conduct.
The firm is socially conscious about addressing behavior that contributes to
racism and sexism in society.

Some of these are competing expressions; others are at tension with one another. So, how
can I claim that firing in response to immoral conduct is an expression of blame?
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Anderson and Pildes, “Expressive Theories of Law: A General Restatement,” 2000, 1506.
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To see how I can do so, we must distinguish between agent-relative expressions and
agent-neutral expressions. With this distinction in place, it will prove helpful for better
understanding my claim.
Philosophical and legal discussions of expressive theories typically go as follows:
Agent X performs act Y and in doing so expresses propositional or reactive attitudes A, B,
C, or character traits P, Q, R and so on. For example, with respect to enacting a law that
segregates schools, perhaps the government expresses the following sorts of things: 63
a) That the government considers black people inferior to white people.
b) That the government thinks that black people will ruin the experience of white
people in contexts in which there is integration.
c) That the government is disgusted by black people.
d) That the government is callous.
e) That it is an expression of contempt.
(a)-(d) involves attributions of attitudes (both propositional and non-propositional) and
character traits (“callous”) to the actor in question (in this case, the government). Whereas
(e) is importantly different. I’ll first discuss (a)-(d).
Someone who asserts that the government expresses any (or all) of (a)-(d) by
enacting a law that segregates might endorse the following sort of principle:
Agent-Relative Expressions: The best explanation for an agent performing the act
in question in the relevant context involves the agent having a particular cluster of
attitudes/beliefs/traits.
One way to make sense of those who assert that an action performed by P expresses (in the
agent-relative sense) some cluster of attitudes/beliefs/traits T about P is that they are
63
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adopting as the first premise in the following argument a hypothesis about what mental
states or character traits P must have to perform the action in a certain context:
1) If an agent does X in context C, then the best explanation for the agent’s doing
X in C is that the agent has cluster of beliefs/attitudes/traits T.
2) John did X in context C.
3) Therefore, the best explanation for John’s doing X in context C is that he has
cluster of beliefs/attitudes/traits T. [1,2]
4) If the best explanation for an agent’s doing X in context C is that the agent has
cluster of beliefs/attitudes/traits T and the agent does X in context C, the agent
expresses T.
5) Therefore, John expressed T. [2,3,4]
So, here, John’s X-ing expressed beliefs/attitudes/traits T. This is how we might understand
the reasoning of those who assert that enacting a law that segregates expresses (a)-(d) about
the government. It involves holding that the best explanation for performing the act
involves the agent having certain attitudes, beliefs, or traits. I will now show how this
discussion of agent-relative expressions applies to two examples due to Anderson and Pildes.
Anderson and Pildes state, “In burning the United States flag, antiwar protesters
expressed the belief that United States involvement in the Vietnam war was wrong.” 64 This is
an agent-relative expression because it involves adopting the following hypothesis: the best
explanation for a person’s burning an American flag at an antiwar protest is that the person
believed that the United States’ involvement in the Vietnam war was wrong. Something
similar can be said about this second example involving racial segregation: “Racial
segregation sends the message that blacks are untouchable, a kind of social pollutant from
which “pure” whites must be protected.”65 On the agent-relative understanding of
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Anderson and Pildes, “Expressive Theories of Law: A General Restatement,” 2000, 1506.
Ibid., 1528.
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expressions, this statement would be interpreted as claiming that the best explanation for an
institution implementing laws that segregate the population is that the institution considers
black people as untouchable or “impure.” The agent-relative category seems to explain
several expressions that theorists claim certain actions express.
I will note a worry in passing about expressions in the agent-relative sense. The level
of granularity of the expression being inferred from the act seems far too fine to be
plausible. We might say, for example, an act expresses something negative about the agent who
performed the act, but to claim it is the particular expression of “a kind of social pollutant
from which “pure” white must be protected” seems to be an implausible inferential
overreach.
However, (a)-(d) are not the only kinds of expressions relevant to enacting a law that
segregates schools. The enacting of a law that segregates a school might also be an act that is
an expression of contempt—that is, (e). And (e) is importantly different from (a)-(d). This is
because (e) need not involve ascribing anything to the agent performing the act (in the way
(a)-(d) do). As such, we require a different kind of principle to capture (e). We need
something like:
Agent-Neutral Expressions: When an act X is performed in context C, X is an
expression of T.
Agent-neutral expressions do not involve claims about the beliefs, attitudes, or traits of the
performer of an action. Rather, they involve claims about the act-context complex itself.
Agent-neutral expressions involve claims about how certain contexts can make an act take
on an additional significance. There are further questions about why actions in certain
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contexts express certain attitudes that turn on complicated issues concerning the nature of
act meaning more generally. The important point is that an agent-neutral expression need
not involve any substantive inferences about the agent performing the act; rather, the act
expresses what it does simply in virtue of having been performed in a particular context.
The agent-neutral category of expressions can explain several examples of expressive
actions that Anderson and Pildes offer. For example, “lawmakers could pass a law that
expresses contempt for blacks by denying them the right to vote, even if none of the
lawmakers personally feel contempt for blacks and all are merely pandering to their white
constituents.”66 In this example, the passing of the law in that context is itself an expression
of contempt. And this is so, independent of what we might say about the beliefs, attitudes,
and traits of the lawmakers.
Another example Anderson and Pildes offer proceeds as follows: “Suppose an
individual burns a piece of paper. What does that mean? If the paper is a draft card, and he
burns it in the context of others doing the same thing at an antiwar rally, we understand his
action to express outrage at the draft.”67 In this situation, the burning of the draft card in the
context of a protest is itself an expression of outrage (this is so, even if the person burning
the card was a pyromaniac who was in it for the fun and did not care at all about the
morality of the war).
An important point I should note is that an agent-neutral expression need not imply
any particular set of agent-relative expressions, nor does an agent-relative expression
necessarily imply any particular agent-neutral expression. The distinction between agent66
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relative expressions and agent-neutral expressions highlights the importance of
distinguishing between a claim that performing an act expresses something about the traits
or beliefs about the agent performing that act, versus a claim about an act itself being an
expression of some attitude or another. It is nevertheless worth noting that sometimes the
reasoning or processes, tacit or explicit, that leads one to recognize an agent-neutral
expression might hinge on certain agent-relative expressions.
In our investigation, when I say that the act of firing in response to a Twitter trial is
an expression of blame, I mean expression in the agent-neutral sense. One might think that
all of the following are expressed by the firm firing the employee in the wake of immoral
conduct that gives rise to a Twitter trial:
•
•
•

The business only cares about its profit.
The business considers it important to promote certain moral values in the
community.
The business regards its employees as dispensable cogs in the wheel.

But these are expressions in the agent-relative sense. I will not take a stance on what the
firing in response to a Twitter trial expresses in the agent-relative sense. I should also note
that the kind of hypothesis involved in agent-relative expressions might be involved in
creating the agent-neutral expression over time. But that is a different issue, namely, that of
the causal source of the agent-neutral expression. I think each of these above agent-relative
expressions are plausible and interesting, but they are not my concern here. I am only
making the claim that firings in certain contexts are expressions of blame in the agent-neutral
sense.
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Specifically, I am defending the claim that when a firing occurs in response to an
employee’s allegedly immoral conduct that gives rise to a Twitter trial, the firing is an
expression of blame. I am not making a claim about the beliefs, attitudes, or traits of the
agent doing the firing. I am making a claim about the fact that firing in Twitter trial
situations is itself an expression of blame. And with agent-neutral expressions, the
manager’s intention can be irrelevant. With the distinction between agent-neutral expression
and agent-relative expression in hand, one can hold that a firing in response to a Twitter trial
is an expression of blame, while remaining agnostic about what the firing expresses about
the business itself in the agent-relative sense.
The crucial point is that whether an act is an expression of blame in the agent-neutral
sense does not solely turn on the actor’s intentions. The irrelevance of intentions can be
brought out even more strikingly. Consider the following example in which a person intends
to blame, but cannot, because the act through which he intends to express blame is not an
expression of blame in the agent-neutral sense.
Suppose I arrive in Philadelphia from a faraway land. One of the distinctive cultural
practices of my homeland is that blame is expressed through hugs. Our rationale for
expressing blame through hugs is that the act of wrapping one’s arms around another in a
full embrace signals the entirety of one’s blaming attitudes. It also captures that I am blaming
you, not just something you said or did, and it also shows that I recognize you as a member
of the moral community. Suppose soon after arriving in Philadelphia, I am wronged by
someone. I then hug the person who has wronged me, intending to blame that person.
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However, the hug does not express blame in Philadelphia.68 It might even be understood as
the opposite of what I intend; it might instead express that I am a person exuding warmth
and aspiring toward reconciliation, forgiveness, and understanding. Agent-neutral
expressions need not depend on the actor’s intention. Sometimes, it does not depend on it at
all. Sometimes, you might even intend to blame, but not be able to express it in the agentneutral sense.
Back to the issue of the business not intending to blame. Suppose after reading the
first page of this dissertation, the firm I refer to complains, “How could you say we were
inappropriately blaming, when we weren’t blaming at all? Our intention was strictly to
disassociate.” This raises complex questions about whether there is a way to counteract an
agent-neutral expression. There are times when what our action expresses is not what we
intended to express. When we do that, we might respond with, “Oh! That’s not what I
meant.” Sometimes, such a response is plausible. But in other instances, the context and
conventions surrounding the agent-neutral expression are so vivid, salient, and deeply
entrenched that, even if one were to respond with, “Oh! That’s not what I meant,” it would
be “mere words,” so to speak. Our mere assertion that we intended to express something
different from the agent-neutral expression of an act is in some circumstances simply not
strong enough to override the strength of the agent-neutral expression.
Moreover, we might think that the reason the business is able to secure the benefits
of disassociating (getting Twitter trial participants to move on, for example) is because the
See Anderson and Pildes: “Even sincerely and accurately professing one’s state of mind may self-defeatingly
fail to express it. If a well-meaning State posted signs at public restrooms saying “Jews are welcome here,”
would this action, by calling attention to the religion of those welcomed, genuinely express welcome for them,
or would it express an embarrassing unease over their presence?” “Expressive Theories of Law: A General
Restatement,” 2000, 1567.
68
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firing is an “authoritative disavowal”69—that is, because it is an act that expresses blame in
the agent-neutral sense. If the Twitter trial participants knew that the business was only
intending to disassociate, they may not move on and might be even more agitated.
So, one important feature of acts that express blame is that the expression of blame
is not wholly determined by a person’s intentions. Acts in certain contexts are expressions of
blame, regardless of one’s intentions. When a judge hands down a prison sentence, this is a
form of condemnation that expresses blame, regardless of whether the judge’s intentions
were entirely unrelated to blame (e.g., to help the defendant access the healthcare provided
in prisons). Similarly, when a business fires an employee immediately after some immoral
conduct that has received a great deal of negative publicity in the form of a Twitter trial, the
act of firing is an expression of blame, regardless of whether the business had only intended
to disassociate.
It is true that firing is not always an act of blame; often it is not. But in the contexts
of Twitter trials, when a business fires an employee immediately after a social media storm of
outrage, the act of firing is also an act of blame independent of the business’s intentions. In a
Twitter trial, thousands of people condemn an employee and many call upon the employer
to terminate the employee. Here are examples of tweets during the Twitter trial involving
Sacco:
o “#IAC needs to fire this racist, stupid bitch!”
o “We are about to watch [Sacco] get fired. In REAL time. Before she even
KNOWS she’s getting fired.”
69
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o “I cannot stop laughing at the sheer stupidity of #JustineSacco, enjoy your
time in the unemployment line…”
When there are thousands of such tweets, it creates a context in which the act of firing is no
longer merely employment termination, but it also is an expression of blame in the agentneutral sense.

On Communicating Blame in Response to Twitter trials
The question of what one is expressing is not the same question as what one is
communicating. A communication is a subset of expressions. As Anderson and Pildes note,
“To communicate a mental state requires that one express it with the intent that others
recognize that state by recognizing the communicative intention.” 70 For example, an
interviewee’s fidgeting may express nervousness, but this is not what the interviewee is
seeking to communicate (usually, quite the opposite).71
Thus far, I have argued that firing in response to a Twitter trial is an expression of
blame. But in instances of Twitter trials, the business not only expresses blame, it also
sometimes explicitly communicates it. The firm does this by coupling the firing with a
condemnatory press release. For instance, soon after Sacco’s tweet, IAC stated:

It is worth noting that communications could be used as a means of concealing one’s intended purpose for
performing the act. For example, one might explicitly communicate blame as the reason for firing, but the
actual reason for firing might simply be that the manager does not like having a person of a different ethnicity
working in his office.
71 To illustrate this point, Anderson and Pildes give the example of a shoplifter’s “furtive glances” expressing
an intention not to get caught, while this being not at all what the shoplifter is attempting to communicate.
“Expressive Theories of Law: A General Restatement,” 2000, 1508.
70
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“We take this issue very seriously, and we have parted ways with the employee in
question. There is no excuse for the hateful statements that have been made and we
condemn them unequivocally.”72
Sacco’s firing was not only an expression of blame through the act of firing, it also was
coupled with an explicitly communicated form of blame. If a business claims to fire an
employee for non-moral reasons related to disassociating, coupling the firing with a
condemnatory press release of the sort that IAC did would be dishonest and disingenuous.
Importantly, even if the employee is friends with many of her colleagues and
managers, and knows and believes that the decision to fire her is strictly a business decision
to disassociate, this is not enough not to make it an expression of blame. As Anderson and
Pildes state, “the “recipients” of actions also do not have exclusive control over the public
meanings of those actions…”73 If a business pairs the firing with a moralizing press release
that accompanies the firing, or fires an employee in certain contexts (e.g., in response to a
Twitter trial), then this is an act of blame.
But this alone does not license the conclusion I am seeking in the broader project—
that businesses are acting inappropriately in blaming through firing in response to the
Twitter trial. This is because the fact that an act is an expression of blame does not settle the

Despite this explicit condemnation, IAC in the next sentence states, “We hope, however, that time and
action, and the forgiving spirit, will not result in the wholesale condemnation of an individual who we have
otherwise known to be a decent person at core.” See Coine and Babbitt, A World Gone Social, 29. This is an
interesting inclusion, and one that seems to be at tension with condemning “unequivocally.” The question of
how including this qualification interacts with the expression of condemnation, and to what extent it can be
meaningfully uttered in the same breath as the communication of condemnation, may turn on difficult issues in
the philosophy of language related to the relationship between semantic and pragmatic content and meaning.
For a seminal discussion of issues related to the relationship between semantic and pragmatic meaning, see
Herbert P Grice, “Logic and Conversation,” in Studies in the Way of Words (Harvard University Press, 1989), 22–
40.
73 “Expressive Theories of Law: A General Restatement,” 2000, 1524.
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issue of whether it is an inappropriate expression of blame. Indeed, there are many instances
of blame that most think are well-justified and appropriate. The task in the next two chapters
is to argue that it is morally inappropriate for a business to blame an employee through firing
in response to a Twitter trial.
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CHAPTER 4: DESERT, BLAME, AND THE ADDITIVITY
PRINCIPLE
Introduction
The ethics of blame emerges as a significant area of inquiry once we recognize that a
person’s being blameworthy (deserving blame) does not settle the question of whether we
ought to blame that person. 74 Consider the following examples that illuminate the distinction
between judging that blameworthy and blaming75:
A. Mother: A mother who learns that her son is guilty of theft might recognize her
son to be blameworthy without blaming him. 76
B. Driveway: Suppose an otherwise caring father recklessly fails to check his rearview
mirror while exiting his driveway and runs over and kills his toddler. One might
think him blameworthy for his recklessness, but still not blame him, given the
immense emotional suffering associated with losing one’s child.
C. Therapist: A psychologist working in a prison might recognize that an inmate is
blameworthy for murder without blaming the inmate. This might be because
While most theorists seem to think that blame is a fitting, appropriate, justified, or apt response to
wrongdoing, some recent theorists, notably Miranda Fricker and Marilyn Friedman, have helpfully articulated
certain conditions that one must satisfy to blame another appropriately. See Fricker, “What’s the Point of
Blame? A Paradigm Based Explanation,” March 1, 2016; Friedman, “How to Blame People Responsibly.”
Their suggestion is that since blaming is an action, moreover an action with corrosive effects, one can perform
it more or less appropriately, and in better or worse ways. An implication of this is that the set of individuals
who are blameworthy may very well be larger than the set of individuals who any one of us can permissibly
blame.
75 It is worth noting that this distinction is not a trivial feature of my account. Some skeptical accounts of
responsibility suggest that blaming does not make sense because agents are never blameworthy. See Gideon
Rosen, “Culpability and Ignorance,” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 103, no. 1 (2002); Gideon Rosen,
“Skepticism about Moral Responsibility,” Philosophical Perspectives 18 (2004): 295–313. I am not defending this
sort of view. Indeed, a critical aspect of my argument is that agents are blameworthy (and yet it can be
inappropriate to blame them).
76 I am here open to the possibility that the mother should blame her son. But this is not at odds with the point I
am making: judging that someone is blameworthy is different from blaming.
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blaming is counterproductive to therapeutic aims.77
The reasons why one may judge another to be blameworthy, yet still think it inappropriate to
blame, are diverse. 78 For instance, in Mother, certain familial relations may require the mother
to withhold blame. In Driveway, perhaps compassion requires one to suppress blame.79 In
Therapist, successfully performing certain professional roles might require one not to blame.
For our current purposes, however, what is important is that blaming a person and judging
that person to be blameworthy are separable.80
The ethics of blame is still a nascent area of inquiry with many unsettled questions,
including, for example, why, if at all, hypocritical blaming is inappropriate 81, how “moral
standing” is a sensible notion if morality is universal82, and so on. Despite the lively ongoing
debate, one aspect of the debate remains uncontroversial: for blame to be appropriate, one
should not blame a person who does not deserve blame or blame a person beyond what she

For a discussion of the unproductiveness of blame in therapeutic contexts see Hanna Pickard,
“Responsibility without Blame: Empathy and the Effective Treatment of Personality Disorder,” Philosophy,
Psychiatry, & Psychology: PPP 18, no. 3 (2011): p. 209; Hanna Pickard, “Responsibility without Blame:
Philosophical Reflections on Clinical Practice,” Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Psychiatry, 2013, 1134–54).
78 Another instance in which one might judge that a person is blameworthy yet not blame her might be when
one forgives. That is, forgiveness might be understood as occurring when a victim X recognizes that Y is
blameworthy for wronging her, yet X nevertheless opts not to blame Y (or opts to stop blaming Y). Indeed
many influential accounts of forgiveness understand the concept as involving the overcoming of resentment.
But the issue of forgiveness is more complicated. For problems with accounts that understand forgiveness as
involving the forgoing of resentment toward a wrongdoer, see Lucy Allais “Wiping the Slate Clean: The Heart
of Forgiveness,” Philosophy & Public Affairs 36, no. 1 (2008): 33–68.
79 A different interpretation of Driveway might be that when a wrongdoer is overcome with a high-degree of
guilt for certain kinds of wrongdoings, this might render blaming inappropriate.
80 Gary Watson puts this position as follows: “Since it is one thing to think that someone deserves to be an
object of such attitudes and another actually to have these attitudes, on this view one can judge someone to be
blameworthy without blaming him or her oneself.” See “Two Faces of Responsibility,” in Agency and
Answerability: Selected Essays (Oxford University Press, 2004), 278.
81 Gerald Cohen, “Casting the First Stone: Who Can, and Who Can’t, Condemn the Terrorists?,” Royal Institute
of Philosophy Supplement 58 (2006): 113–36; Kyle Fritz and Daniel Miller, “Hypocrisy and the Standing to Blame,”
Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 97, no. 2 (2015): 1–22; R. Jay Wallace, “Hypocrisy, Moral Address, and the Equal
Standing of Persons,” Philosophy and Public Affairs 38, no. 4 (2010); Patrick Todd, “A Unified Account of the
Moral Standing to Blame,” Noûs, forthcoming.
82 Saul Smilansky, “The Paradox of Moral Complaint,” Utilitas 18, no. 3 (2006): 284–90.
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deserves.83 Miranda Fricker characterizes blaming someone who is not blameworthy or
blaming someone out of proportion to what she deserves as being pathologies of blame.84
We can capture this position with the following principle:

Non-Excess: It is wrong to blame a person who does not deserve blame or to
blame a person beyond what she deserves.

I too believe Non-Excess. Consider the following example as an illustration of the
principle:

Hotel: Patrick realizes his watch is missing. He frantically searches the room and
becomes convinced that the housekeeper stole his watch. Contrary to what Patrick
thinks, the watch is in Patrick’s gym bag—he had taken off his watch before going
for a swim.

Here, if Patrick blamed the housekeeper, he would wrong the housekeeper. This is so even if
the housekeeper is not in any way materially harmed. An apology would be in order.

Manuel Vargas notes it is less plausible to justify our moral responsibility practices “in terms of the efficacy
of particular tokenings of praising and blaming” than in terms of the “group-level effects of justified norms
that are ubiquitously internalized by members of the community and regularly put into practice.” Building Better
Beings: A Theory of Moral Responsibility (Oxford University Press, 2012), p. 172. Importantly, “one can allow that
the justification of praise and blame might derive from the efficacy of those norms in influencing us, without
thereby committing ourselves to the view that every instance, or even every type of characteristic emotional
reaction, thereby contributes to influencing us in the appropriate way.” Ibid., 180. I am sympathetic to Vargas’
line of argument on this issue, but will not discuss his view further here. I bring up this matter simply to draw
attention to the different levels at which one might justify (or object to) blaming practices.
84 “What’s the Point of Blame? A Paradigm Based Explanation,” Nous, 2014.
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54

In this chapter and the next, I argue that if we want to preserve our commitment to
Non-Excess, we require the following principle:

The Additivity Principle: The appropriateness of an act of blame depends on how
much others blame.

This principle has significance for the ethics of blame, and it also has implications for our
understanding of the nature of desert-claims.
Many contemporary desert theorists believe the following about desert-claims: (1)
they generate pro-tanto reasons to provide the desert object in question and (2) they do not
generate obligations. I will claim that closely examining desert-objects that possess certain
characteristics, of which, blame is a paradigm example, will show that both (1) and (2) are
mistaken. This point is brought into sharp relief due to the same unique features of blame
that give significance to the additivity principle.
In addition to characterizing, motivating, and defending the additivity principle, I
discuss its implications for the broader project: I argue that the additivity principle provides
the manager a strong reason to think that his or her act of blaming through firing constitutes
an inappropriate act of blame.

Preliminary Remarks On Desert
Conceptual Dimensions of Desert
The additivity principle is the missing piece that is needed to reconcile the structural
features of desert-claims with certain kinds of desert objects, of which blame is a paradigm
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example. To see why, we need to examine the nature of desert. So, I start the discussion in
this section by introducing the elements that constitute desert-claims.85
My aim here is to provide enough of an understanding of the concept of desert so
that we can talk sensibly about desert as it relates to this dissertation—deserving blame.
Given that my purpose is not to offer a conceptual analysis of desert, there are significant
aspects of the debate I pass over. With that said, let’s first contrast desert from some
neighboring concepts: eligibility, entitlement, and “ought to receive.”
Suppose I have not been meeting my earnings targets due to spending my work
hours loitering on the social media pages of old classmates. I might be eligible for a bonus but
not deserve it. On the other hand, a person might be entitled to earnings associated with
executing a trade but not deserve the earnings due to the trade execution having been a sheer
fluke. Relatedly, someone might deserve something but not be entitled to it: a person who
deserves a bonus for her skilled leadership during a recession might not be entitled to it
because of some accounting rule that prevents her from receiving her bonus this calendar
year. Desert also does not mean “ought to receive.” We might think that destitute children
ought to receive support from the well-off but not think that they deserve it.
Let’s now clarify the structure and elements of desert-claims of the sort “X deserves
Y.”
The Subject of Desert Claims
In a desert claim of the sort, “X deserves Y,” the “X” stands for the subject of the
desert ascription. I am concerned with desert ascriptions where the subjects are persons; that

My discussion regarding the conceptual structure of desert is indebted to Feinberg, Doing & Deserving: Essays
in the Theory of Responsibility.
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is, it is a person who deserves some object. Some think non-persons can be the subject in
desert-claims too—for example, we might coherently say Lyft deserves praise for making a
1M donation to the ACLU. We might also say things like, “Enron deserved punishment.”
We might even say that certain initiatives deserve our support. Some also ascribe desert to
art (e.g., the Pietà deserves praise), nature (e.g., “Mauna Kea deserves our admiration”), among
other things. But in this dissertation, my concern will be desert ascriptions with respect to
persons.

The Desert Object
If “X” is the subject in a desert claim of the sort “X deserves Y,” then “Y” is the
desert-object—the thing that the subject is said to deserve. There are many things—accolades,
praise, awards, offices, honors, grades, punishment—that might be understood to be the
desert object.86 Some think that any object can be deserved, but others think only certain
instantiations of praise and dispraise can be deserved. Yet others think that only distributable
goods can be deserved. I will not get into these issues, because, conveniently, my focus will
be on whether blame is deserved, and this is, without controversy, the kind of thing that can
be deserved.87 The desert object that is the focus of this and the next chapter is blame.

Ibid.
Of course, this is apart from scholars who deny the very concept of desert due to holding hard
incompatabilist views. See, for example, Derk Pereboom, Living Without Free Will (Cambridge University Press,
2001).
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Desert Bases
I have thus far construed desert-claims as “X deserves Y.” Joel Feinberg suggests
that such claims are incomplete and unintelligible: a desert basis is required.88 The desert
basis is the answer to the question of: “In virtue of what does X deserve Y?” No one in the
literature has attempted to provide an exhaustive list of possible desert bases, in part because
“the bases of desert vary with the mode of deserved treatment.”89 There are also important
questions concerning the nature of the relationship between the desert basis and the desert
object; for example, there is the question regarding what it takes to count as a desert basis. I
will not delve into such issues. What matters for this dissertation is that acting wrongly or
badly constitutes a desert basis for blame.

Introducing the Adicity of Desert:
We now have the components required to arrive at what has been called the
“adicity” of desert.90 Desert-claims, in its canonical formulation, are understood as three-part
relations.91 For example:

The manager deserves praise due to her skillful leadership.

Here, the manager is the subject. The object is praise. And the basis for the manager’s
deserving praise is her skilled leadership.

Feinberg, Doing & Deserving: Essays in the Theory of Responsibility, 58.
Ibid., 61.
90 Fred Feldman, Distributive Justice: Getting What We Deserve from Our Country (Oxford University Press, 2016), 36.
91 Feinberg, Doing & Deserving: Essays in the Theory of Responsibility.
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Feinberg’s tripartite analysis seems to leave out something. This omission is most
salient from the lack of answer to the following question: Who should distribute the
“praise,” or, in other words, who is the “source,” “provider,” or “distributor” of the praise?
To account for this gap, we might amend Feinberg’s formulation to add:

The manager deserves praise from her team due to her skillful leadership.

Here, the manager is the subject. The object is praise. The distributor is the team (I will use
“distributor” throughout the remainder of this dissertation. I understand its use to be
interchangeable with “source” or “provider.”) And the basis for the manager’s deserving
praise is her skilled leadership.
It is worth flagging that there is debate about whether to structure desert-claims as
three or four-part relations: some think we do not need a fourth element if we could build
“distributor” into the desert object (the object the person deserves is, “praise from team”). 92
While this seems plausible, other scholars think little hangs on whether we structure desertclaims as three-part relations or four-part relations.93

The Normative Dimensions of Desert Claims

Many scholars believe it is important that people get what they deserve. As Shelly
Kagan notes, “…it matters, morally, whether people are in fact getting what they deserve.
Feldman, Distributive Justice: Getting What We Deserve from Our Country, 40.
Fred Feldman and Brad Skow, “Desert,” ed. Edward N. Zalta, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
(Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University, 2016),
https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2016/entries/desert/.
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More particularly, it is a good thing, morally speaking, if people are getting what they deserve.
A world in which people are getting what they deserve is a better one than a world in which
they are not.”94 But satisfying desert claims is not the only thing that matters, morally
speaking. It is in principle possible that the value of desert is at odds with other moral values,
and indeed it is also possible that desert-claims are outweighed by other moral
considerations.95
What is important is that “a person’s desert of X is always a reason for giving X to
him, but not always a conclusive reason.”96 For this reason, many desert-theorists accept the
following:

Pro-Tanto: Desert claims generate pro-tanto reasons to provide the desert object.

Since providing the desert-object to the desert-subject is considered a good thing, morally
speaking, but not the only thing that matters morally, many theorists think we have pro-tanto
reasons to provide the desert-object. This is so, even when the desert-object is blame. For
instance, Michael McKenna notes, “Of course, the goodness at issue here only offers pro
tanto reasons for blaming, and so naturally could be overridden by other factors.” 97 Making a
similar point about desert, but using “prima facie” terminology instead of “pro tanto,”
Michael Zimmerman states,

Shelly Kagan, The Geometry of Desert (New York: Oxford University Press, 2012), 5.
Ibid., 17–18; Feinberg, Doing & Deserving: Essays in the Theory of Responsibility, 80.
96 Feinberg, Doing & Deserving: Essays in the Theory of Responsibility, 60.
97 Michael McKenna, Conversation and Responsibility (New York: Oxford University Press, 2012), 170.
94
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“Desert is a prima facie matter. To say that someone morally deserves a certain
treatment is in part to say that there is a moral consideration in favor of his being so
treated. (That is so, even if desert in some cases imposes no ought-to-do; for, even
where it fails to impose an ought-to-do, it nevertheless provides a good-reason-to-do.)
But it is not to say that there is a conclusive moral consideration in favor of being so
treated. Desert constitutes just one moral consideration, and the force of its presence
or absence can in principle be overridden by other considerations”98

Many believe we have reason (some think, strong reason) to provide the desert-object in
question to the desert-subject, absent overriding considerations. As Serena Olsaretti says,
“Most desert claims have moral force, in the sense that they are prima facie ought claims: the
fact that someone deserves something means that she ought, other things being equal, to
receive that thing, or that it would be morally better if she did.”99
Suppose John deserves a bonus. But the firm has hit a rough patch and cannot
afford to provide John the bonus. On the view of many desert theorists, the firm has a protanto reason to provide John with a bonus, but this can be overridden by other kinds of
moral considerations (e.g., reducing unfair inequalities in compensation100) as well as nonmoral considerations (e.g., not having the liquidity to pay it). So, keeping the pro-tanto
qualifier allows for the overriding of desert-claims. The thought is that desert is indeed
important, but not the only thing that is important. A wide range of desert theorists think that
desert-claims provide pro-tanto reasons to provide the desert object.
Michael J. Zimmerman, An Essay on Moral Responsibility (Rowman & Littlefield, 1988), 162.
Serena Olsaretti, “Introduction: Debating Desert and Justice,” in Desert and Justice, ed. Serena Olsaretti
(Oxford University Press, 2003), 8.
100 Jeffrey Moriarty, “Do CEOs Get Paid Too Much?,” Business Ethics Quarterly 15, no. 2 (2005): 257–81.
98
99
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In addition to Pro-Tanto, there is another feature of desert-claims that many accept:

No Obligation: Desert-claims rarely, if at all, generate obligations.

For example, while an authorsubject may deserve recognitionobject, such a desert-claim places no
person under an obligation to provide the desert object (recognition) in question to the
subject (the author).
A range of theorists seem to endorse something akin to No Obligation. Douglas
Husak points out, “One noteworthy feature of desert judgments is that they seldom, if ever,
impose correlative obligations or duties on anyone to treat the deserving party in a particular
way.”101 George Sher too believes something like No Obligation, “For in many cases, what
is most striking about desert-claims is precisely that they do not imply anything about what
particular persons ought to do…we typically do not mean that anyone is obligated to take
steps to provide what is deserved.”102 Sher makes the point about the difference between the
normative dimensions of desert-claims and the realm of obligations even more pointedly in
the following passage:
“…most desert-claims, I argue, are grounded in values rather than in obligations.
Where desert affects what persons ought to do, it generally does so only indirectly.

Douglas N. Husak, “Why Punish the Deserving,” Nous 26, no. 4 (1992): 449.
George Sher, Desert (Princeton University Press, 1987), 5. This citation is due to Husak, “Why Punish the
Deserving,” 449. It is worth noting that there might be reason to think that Sher does not think the realm of
obligations is entirely divorced from the realm of desert: “…for even if desert-claims do not themselves dictate
actions, the values from which they draw their force may surely have an important influence on the obligations
that do. There is no reason to expect that influence to be straightforward or direct…”Desert, 202. Sher
occasionally seems to suggest that desert-claims place people under obligations. But when he does, it seems
that he is conflating entitlement with desert.
101
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This means that, despite appearances, desert-claims and rights-claims seldom
conflict.”103
Desert theorists commonly think it is permissible, indeed a good thing, to satisfy desertclaims, but that desert-claims do not generate obligations.
We now have most of the conceptual pieces in place to situate the discussion of the
additivity principle. What I will now argue is that in thinking of the normative-dimension of
desert-claims (i.e., Pro-Tanto and No Obligation), we must pay closer attention to the
nature of the desert-object built into the desert-claim. I then suggest that the additivity
principle comes from certain overlooked dimensions of desert-claims: desert-objects with
certain special characteristics can play an important role in how we should think of the
nature and structure of desert-claims for these objects. Importantly, these sorts of desertobjects (especially blame) are at odds with the standard understanding of the normative
structure of desert-claims (i.e., Pro-Tanto and No Obligation).

Classifying Desert-Objects
Let’s now revisit desert-objects. Below is Feinberg’s taxonomy of desert objects:104
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

103
104

Awards of prizes
Assignments of grades
Rewards and punishments
Praise, blame, and other informal responses
Reparation, liability, and other modes of compensation

Sher, Desert, 21.
Feinberg, Doing & Deserving: Essays in the Theory of Responsibility, 62.

63

Feinberg’s taxonomy may suffice for the purposes of classification. However, I think there is
another method of organization that better illuminates the unique normative significance of
certain desert objects, especially blame. Specifically, this involves classifying the objects into
two categories: objects that would wrong the person who it is distributed to absent a desertclaim and objects that would not. I will explain.
I ask the reader for a moment to put aside desert-related questions and simply
consider the nature of the objects in Feinberg’s taxonomy. Consider an award of a prize
absent a desert-claim. We could give somebody a prize—say a certificate, trophy, cash-prize,
so on—without doing anything immoral. One would have no complaint about receiving
$10,000 in cash.105 It might be peculiar or surprising to receive a prize-certificate for no
reason at all.106 But importantly, one needs no special justification to give somebody such an
object in everyday life; sometimes, giving somebody the object absent any justification, might
increase its significance (perhaps akin to how buying one’s partner a gift without occasion
might increase its significance).
Something similar can be said about giving a person a reward, praise, “good
grades,”107 reparation, or “other modes of compensation.” These kinds of objects are good,

Perhaps there are some exceptions: a person desiring to overcome a cocaine habit might have a complaint
about receiving the cash injection given the role the cash may play in sustaining the habit. Thanks to Matthew
Caulfield for raising this point.
106 One can imagine instances in which giving someone a prize might, perhaps through a sort of conversational
implicature, wrong them. For example, if an audience burst into applause immediately after a performance that
went poorly, or if an award committee gave the first-prize to someone who made the most embarrassing
mistakes, this would flout certain “conversational” maxims and thereby indicate that the applause or first-prize
means something at odds with the conventional meaning of applause or a first-prize. See Grice, “Logic and
Conversation.” It is also worth noting that giving a prize to someone who does not deserve it might be unfair to
the person who does deserve it. Perhaps it could be that by giving this person the prize, it wronged the person
who did deserve it. Note, however, that this would be at odds with the received understanding of desert not
being the sort of thing that generates obligations.
107 I can imagine somebody who is simply given a good grade without it being deserved may have a complaint
against the professor or teacher for not taking her job seriously. But this is a different kind of complaint, not
about the receipt of the grade itself, but rather, about the professor failing to take her duties seriously.
105
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wanted, desired, unobjectionable, etc. The critical point is that we could give the person the
object (independent of questions about desert), without acting wrongly.
With other kinds of desert-objects, for instance bad grades, punishment, and blame,
it would under normal circumstances be impermissible to give to a person absent a desertclaim. In other words, some kinds of objects, had we not deserved that object, it would be
wrong for somebody to give it to us. This is an important fact that will complicate the
received understanding of the normative structure of desert-claims.
If one were to give someone a bad grade absent a desert-claim, the person who
received the grade would have a legitimate complaint of being treated badly or unfairly.
Punishment is similarly noteworthy.
The feature I am highlighting is illuminated by the following well-known puzzle
about punishment: What is it about criminal wrongdoing that makes treating a person in
ways that would normally be impermissible (e.g., locking someone up in a small room
without the person wanting to be there) instead permissible? The question is sometimes
answered by referring to a desert-claim (that is, the hard treatment is permissible because the
person deserves it), but the puzzle arises due to the hard treatment associated with
punishment not being something we are ordinarily justified in subjecting another to. The
critical point is that unlike rewards, prizes, and praise, subjecting someone to the treatment
associated with punishment is generally impermissible. Absent the appropriate sort of
justification, subjecting someone to the treatment associated with punishment would wrong
them.
Something similar can be said about the desert-object of blame. Blaming somebody,
that is, subjecting them to anger, resentment, or indignation, absent justification, is
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impermissible. It would be wrong to subject somebody to the treatment that constitute
blame in usual circumstances, absent a desert-claim. A significant aspect of philosophical
discussions of blame concerns what it is about having acted wrongly or badly that renders
treating somebody in the harsh ways associated with blaming permissible.
In sum, with certain objects, if distributed absent special justification (e.g., a desert
claim), it would justifiably generate a complaint; the person is wronged, and an apology
would be owed. While the general point I make applies to punishment, bad grades, and so
on, blame has certain additional distinctive features we must attend to. The distinctive
features that I will now discuss are an important reason why we need the additivity principle
in our ethics of blame and why we will need to rethink the normative structure of desertclaims when the object is blame.

Three Distinctive Features of Blame as a Desert-Object
Incompletely Specified Set of Desert-Distributors
The first distinctive feature of blame is that it does not adequately specify the set of
desert-distributors. This is not the case with many other desert-objects. For instance, when
the desert-object is a prize, the desert-distributor is picked out by the very concept of a
prize—it is the prize committee. Even with punishment, when we say that a person deserves
punishment for assault, it is usually understood that it should be distributed by the state.108
The fact that someone deserves blame, however, often fails to illuminate who should
distribute it. But perhaps there is a way around this problem. As Feinberg points out, the
I am aware that this raises questions about the conceptual possibility of parents and teachers punishing
children. But absent these special circumstances, desert claims where punishment is the object, typically this
implies the state, and only the state, as the desert distributor.
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desert-basis sometimes tells you what the desert-object should be.109 It seems as though the
desert-basis can also, at least in some cases, tell you some of the desert-distributors. For
example, if I deserve blameobject for adulterybasis it seems clear that at least one distributor for
blame has been picked out—my spouse—by virtue of knowing the basis for my deserving
blame. Still, blame is distinct from prizes and punishment in that deserving the prize (or
punishment) picks out an exhaustive set of desert-distributors. Blame on the other hand is
unbounded on (at least) one end in terms of specifying the desert distributors; the fact that I
deserve blame from my spouse for adultery does not imply that only my spouse can distribute
blame.
Non-Discrete
The second distinctive feature of blame is that it is not discrete, or at least it is not
discrete in quite the same way as many other desert objects. If a person deserves a prize,
there is a precise moment she gets what she deserves. If someone deserves a bad grade, she
gets what she deserves as soon as the desert distributor assigns the grade. On the other hand,
with blame, it is an act that is somehow more extended; it is not as though at one moment
the person is blamed and the very next moment the blaming is done. Blaming is sometimes
referred to as a process that lasts over time. Michael McKenna states, “Because the practice
of blaming is part of a dynamic rather than a static process, the goodness of the activity of
blaming is not located just, so to speak, in the moment of blame itself, but in its role in an
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evolving process…”110 Importantly, the blame recipient is the subject of a process with no
apparent expiration date.

Non-Scarce
Prizes are scarce. (Or perhaps intentionally made scarce to give the prize its
significance. For example, honors would lose their significance if they were not scarce). 111
Punishment is scarce too in virtue of costs and space. Blame is non-scarce in two ways: (1) it
is itself ontologically not-scarce (that is, there are not obvious limits to the amount of
indignation or resentment that can be summoned), and (2) the number of possible
distributors is not scarce (it is only limited by the adult population size, which importantly
can change in size).

Theoretical Implications for the Nature of Desert-Claims
I will now discuss some theoretical implications for the nature and structure of
desert-claims that stem from the distinctive features of blame. This will also help clarify why
the additivity principle is required.
In my view, desert-claims whose object is blame often do not generate pro-tanto
reasons to distribute. Moreover, there will often be desert-related obligations (namely, not to
provide the desert object). This stands at odds with the received view about the normative
dimensions of desert-claims (i.e., Pro-Tanto and No Obligation).

110
111

Conversation and Responsibility, 169.
Feinberg, Doing & Deserving: Essays in the Theory of Responsibility.
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Suppose Oriana’s colleague, Jill, has acted wrongly or badly, and Oriana is wondering
whether she should blame Jill. Oriana asks her friend Gastón to have coffee with her to
discuss this matter.
Oriana: “Should I blame Jill?”
Gastón: “It depends. Does Jill deserve blame?”
Confident in Jill’s blameworthiness, Oriana says,
Oriana: “She does.”
This doesn’t seem to tell Gastón everything he wants to know.
Gastón: “But does she deserve blame from you?”
How would Oriana learn whether Jill deserves blame from her? I am not especially
concerned with the epistemic dimension of Oriana’s inquiry, but rather with the moral
dimension, namely: What would make it the case that Jill deserves blame from Oriana?
I propose that asking “Should I blame?” will illuminate the importance of
recognizing that someone’s deserving blame doesn’t settle whether they deserve blame from
one right now.112 Taking on the first-person perspective will also help illuminate two
theoretical results: when the object in a desert-claim is blame, it (1) often does not generate
pro-tanto reasons (thus, Pro-Tanto is false), (2) it often does generate obligations (thus, No
Obligation is false).
One might object that I am merely failing to account for the principle of “moral
standing.” However, this is not quite right. There are distinctions between eligible desertdistributors, eligible desert-distributors with pro-tanto reason to distribute blame, and the set
of those who have moral standing. We should sort out some of these distinctions.

This question also allows one to come to terms with a potential temporal dimension of the ethics of blame
(i.e., Should I blame now?)—perhaps, there is some kind of “statute of limitations of desert.” See Kagan, The
Geometry of Desert, 11.
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First, there is the set of eligible desert-distributors. For some desert-objects, the
nature of the object spells out the exhaustive set of eligible desert-distributors. For example,
the only eligible desert-distributors for the Nobel prize are members of the Nobel
committee. (This is also brings us to one clear counter-example to Pro-Tanto since it is
conceptually confused to think that everybody has a pro-tanto reason to distribute the Nobel
prize; only the Nobel committee does. If the person who deserves the Nobel prize received
the $1m from an anonymous private donor, that person did not get what she deserved.) For
other desert-objects, for example, blame, the set of eligible desert-distributors are the
members of the moral community.113
Second, the set of desert-distributors with pro-tanto reason to distribute blame is a
subset of the set of eligible desert-distributors.114 More specifically, those with pro-tanto
reason to blame are any subset of the set of eligible desert-distributors whose blaming would
not result in violating Non-Excess. In other words, pro-tanto reasons generate up to a
point (the point at which the wrongdoer receives the amount of blame she deserves). Those
with pro-tanto reason to blame are a “slice” of the “eligible desert distributor pie,” but
importantly, not any specific slice.
Third, the set of those who have standing to blame is a subset of the set of eligible
desert-distributors, but it can be distinct from the set of desert-distributors with pro-tanto
reason to blame. I should say more about the concept of moral standing.

Roughly, the moral community is the set of those who satisfy the conditions for full moral agency. For a
detailed discussion of the boundaries of the moral community, see David Shoemaker, “Moral Address, Moral
Responsibility, and the Boundaries of the Moral Community,” Ethics 118 (2007): 70–108.
114 In principle, it could be that for some egregious wrongs the threshold for the amount of blame a wrongdoer
deserves is so high such that the entire set of eligible desert-distributors would have pro-tanto reason to blame.
So, there are some cases in which the set of those with pro-tanto reason to blame is not strictly speaking a
subset of those who are eligible distributors, but rather just is the set of eligible desert-distributors.
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Some speak of blaming as an act that is part of a process. The process involves,
among other things, protecting, upholding, and enforcing communal moral values. Like
many processes, this is one that can be delegitimized. Moral standing might be understood as
follows: when one lacks standing to blame, the act of blaming delegitimizes the blaming
process in certain ways. Three categories are commonly understood to undermine standing:
blaming someone for a wrongdoing that one has performed in the past in similar
circumstances (call this, undermining standing through hypocrisy), blaming someone for a
wrongdoing in which one was culpable (call this, undermining standing through culpability),
blaming someone for something that is none of one’s business (call this, undermining
standing because none of one’s business).115 And if one lacked standing yet were to engage
in blaming, the blaming would in some sense stain the process. A critical point with standing
is this: standing claims do not undermine the veracity of the desert claim. The wrongdoer
does in fact deserve blame. It is simply that the person who lacks standing is not appropriately
positioned to blame the wrongdoer. The desert-claim is conceptually prior to the standing
claim.
In principle, the set of those who have standing to blame need not overlap with
those who have pro-tanto reason to distribute blame. There might be some people who have
pro-tanto reason to blame but lack standing to blame (such people’s blaming would be
inappropriate, not because of violating Non-Excess, but because it is procedurally
illegitimate). Importantly, there might be some people who have standing to blame, but
nevertheless should not exercise their standing. Why? Because they do not have pro-tanto
reason to blame; exercising their standing to blame would wrong the person. The wrong in
Cohen, “Casting the First Stone: Who Can, and Who Can’t, Condemn the Terrorists?,” 2006; Todd, “A
Unified Account of the Moral Standing to Blame.”
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such a case wouldn’t merely be procedurally illegitimate as in paradigmatic cases of blaming
without standing—rather, it is wrong because of violating Non-Excess.
Sometimes, conceptually it does not make sense for just anyone to be a desert
distributor. For example, resentment is something that one could only deserve from a victim
of one’s wrongdoing (whereas indignation is something that is available to third parties). As
such, only the victim of a wrongdoing could have a pro-tanto reason to resent a wrongdoer.
As Christopher Evan Franklin notes, “resentment…is available only as a form of response
to the person wronged.”116 Moreover, even if a victim of a wrongdoing might be a member
of the set of eligible desert-distributors with pro-tanto reason to distribute blame in the form
of resentment, the victim might lose standing to resent due to having performed the same
immoral act as the original offender (here I am assuming hypocrisy undermines standing to
blame). This is an example where one has pro-tanto reason to blame but loses standing.
Thus, having standing to blame and having pro-tanto reason to blame are distinct.
There is an added benefit to acknowledging the distinction between those with protanto reason to distribute blame and those with standing to blame. Some cases commonly
thought to fall under the scope of moral standing may be more naturally explained in terms
of lacking pro-tanto reasons to distribute. As I stated, some think that a wrongdoing being
“none of one’s business” can undermine one’s standing to blame, though few have given an
account of why this is so.117 If my significant other cheats on me, we might say that a thirdparty bystander shouldn’t blame her since the bystander lacks standing (even though my
Christopher Evan Franklin, “Valuing Blame,” in Blame: Its Nature and Norms, ed. D. Justin Coates and Neal
A. Tognazzini (Oxford University Press, 2013), 213.
117 For some theorists who suggest that blame is inappropriate when it is “none of one’s business,” see Radzik,
“On Minding Your Own Business: Differentiating Accountability Relations within the Moral Community”;
McKenna, Conversation and Responsibility, 28; Todd, “A Unified Account of the Moral Standing to Blame”;
Angela Smith, “On Being Responsible and Holding Responsible,” The Journal of Ethics 11, no. 4 (2007): 465–84.
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significant other deserves blame), because it is none of the third party’s business.
Alternatively, we could say that the third-party-bystander never had a pro-tanto reason to
distribute resentment in the first place—and thus is violating a form of Non-Excess. It is that
when one cheats on another, the desert claim generates only one pro-tanto reason, namely
for the person cheated on to express resentment. Other blamers would be wronging because
of violating Non-Excess (since no indignation is deserved). The latter seems like a better
explanation than saying that we all could blame the significant other, but all but the victim
suddenly lose standing because it is none of our business.
With the distinctions between the set of eligible desert-distributors, the set of those
with pro-tanto reason to distribute blame, and the set of those with standing to blame in
place, we are now better positioned to discuss why the received view of the normative
structure of desert is problematic when the desert-object is blame.
The reason Pro-Tanto (desert claims generate pro-tanto reasons to provide the desert object)
and No Obligation (desert-claims rarely, if at all, generate obligations) are false, at least when the
desert-object is blame, is simple. There are two reasons Pro-Tanto is false. First, once a
person is subjected to the amount of blame she deserves, the desert-claim does not generate
any pro-tanto reasons. It does not make sense that the desert-claim entails that persons have
pro-tanto reasons to do what would be wrong (that is, blaming someone beyond what she
deserves). So, desert-claims stop generating pro-tanto reasons when Non-Excess would be
violated. Second, with certain desert objects, it does not make sense that it generates protanto reasons for anyone to provide: If the desert-object is resentment, only victims of the
wrongdoing have pro-tanto reason to distribute that object. It does not make conceptual
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sense for a bystander to have pro-tanto reason to resent (though she might have pro-tanto
reason to be indignant).
The reason No Obligation is false also relates to Non-Excess. Specifically, if an act
of blaming would violate Non-Excess, then obligations generate—namely, obligations not
to provide the desert object (that is, blame). So, we might structure the normative
dimensions of desert-claims as a piece-wise function of sorts: there are pro-tanto reasons to
blame generated only up to and equal to the point at which the subject has received the
amount of blame she deserves. Beyond that point, not only are there no pro-tanto reasons to
blame, but there are obligations not to blame, since blaming would subject the person to
more blame than she deserves.
If theorists who endorse No Obligation take their claim to mean that desert-claims
do not generate obligations to provide the desert-object, then strictly speaking, I think this is
plausible. (But still, one might think this too is false. If someone was being bullied, and you
were well-positioned to blame the bully but did not do so, perhaps you have violated an
obligation to blame that bully.) If on the other hand theorists who endorse No Obligation
claim that desert-claims do not generate obligations simpliciter, No Obligation is false. If I
am correct, contra Sher and others who think that rights-claims and desert-claims are
different realms, desert-claims are more closely related to the realm of obligations than is
commonly understood, and not merely the kind of thing that leads to a good state of affairs,
that may or may not be overridden by consequentialist considerations that override the protanto qualifier. If one’s blaming would result in the wrongdoer receiving blame beyond what
she deserves (in violation of Non-Excess), then desert-claims do generate some obligations,
namely not to blame.
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To conclude this section, desert-claims in many circumstances will not generate protanto reasons to distribute. Desert-claims will also often generate obligations not to
distribute the desert-object in question. Pro-Tanto and No Obligation are false when the
desert-object is blame. In the next section, I will discuss how taking the additivity principle
into consideration will prevent a prospective blamer from acting wrongly by blaming a
person beyond what she deserves.

Situating the Additivity Principle
The additivity principle derives its significance from certain distinctive features of
blame and the need to preserve Non-Excess. I have discussed the distinctive features of
blame (that it has an incompletely specified set of distributors, it is non-discrete, and it is not
scarce); now I will discuss how the additivity principle relates to preserving Non-Excess.
Let’s start with how the additivity principle relates to how a business should respond
when an employee is at the center of a Twitter trial. Returning to the example involving
Sacco, let’s consider two possibilities. First, suppose Sacco’s conduct is not wrong and she
does not deserve blame. In this case, if the business blames her through firing, then the
business acts wrongly (and so too do the other participants in the Twitter trial), because it is
wrong to blame someone who does not deserve blame (in virtue of Non-Excess).
The second possibility is more interesting: Suppose Sacco’s conduct is wrong and
she does deserve blame. At first blush, it seems that she is an appropriate target of blame.
Nevertheless, the fact that she deserves blame does not settle whether one ought to blame
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her.118
Some scholars have acknowledged, when the desert-object is punishment, the fact
that the desert-subject deserves punishment does not mean we should punish her. In other
words, supposing desert-claims justify the hard treatment associated with punishment, still,
this does not mean we should punish the deserving person. As Douglas Husak asks,

“Suppose we are convinced that a particular criminal C deserves a punishment p.
Should p be imposed, all things considered? What reasons, if any, need to be given to
conclude that the punishment that is deserved should actually be inflicted?” 119

The questions he asks are relevant because, in his view, consequentialist considerations can
override the moral importance of the criminal getting what she deserves. He suggests that
even retributivists must evaluate certain consequentialist considerations, for example, the
suffering that fulfilling a desert claim might impose on “dependents or third parties.”120 In
the language of desert-claims, certain consequentialist considerations can override the protanto reason to punish the subject.
To be clear, the fact that desert-claims regarding punishment do not provide decisive
reason to punish the person need not mean that the person doesn’t deserve punishment, or
that we have done away with desert: “If the drawbacks of punishing a deserving offender

Manuel Vargas notes this possibility: “sometimes blaming will be (locally) very costly, and perhaps even
costly enough that it makes sense to maintain that one should not blame those who deserve it.” Though on
Vargas’ view it is unlikely that this is often (or uniformly) the case. See Vargas, Building Better Beings: A Theory of
Moral Responsibility, 242.
119 Husak, “Why Punish the Deserving,” 447. Unfortunately, in this very same article, Husak states that, even if
we decide not to punish the deserving, “the informal expression of attitudes of blame would still be
appropriate.” He seems to fail to see the relevance of his arguments for expressions of blame. Ibid., 460.
120 Husak, “Why Punish the Deserving,” 449.
118
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were too great, it would be mistaken to conclude that, all things considered, he did not
deserve to be punished after all. What is outweighed is the value of treating him in
accordance with his desert.”121 The point is simply that the fact that someone deserves
something, does not conclusively tell us how to act (that is, whether we should provide the
desert-subject the object she deserves).
Just like with punishment, there may be consequentialist considerations that tell
against blaming someone who deserves blame. Some of these consequentialist
considerations are discussed elsewhere in the literature. However, there can also be decidedly
non-consequentialist considerations that tell in favor of not distributing blame. These arise in
virtue of Non-Excess.
Given that blaming someone who does not deserve blame or out of proportion to
what she deserves would wrong that person, one must consider how much blame others have
subjected the person to. Returning to the second scenario involving Sacco, even if Sacco
deserves blame for acting immorally, this does not settle whether one ought to blame her.
The manager must pay attention to the additivity principle:

The Additivity Principle: The appropriateness of an act of blame depends on how
much others blame.

We require this principle to preserve our commitment to Non-Excess and to prevent us
from violating obligations that Non-Excess gives rise to.

121

Ibid., 452.
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If we want to preserve Non-Excess, there are significant implications for a
prospective blamer. I am claiming that prospective blamers must pay attention to the
additivity principle, that is, the extent to which others are blaming. This is because whether
one’s own act of blame will violate Non-Excess depends on whether the wrongdoer gets
the amount of blame she deserves from others.
The dependence relation in the additivity principle must be clarified. This is because
there is no directionality built into the principle, and the principle is consistent with saying
that the more that others are blaming, the more your blame is appropriate—a claim I do not
endorse. We might then amend the principle to say that the appropriateness of your act of
blame depends inversely on how much others are blaming. But this still does not capture what
is at stake. If you are the second person to blame someone for some serious wrongdoing, it
does not mean that your act of blame is less appropriate than the act of blame performed by
the first person to blame.
My view is that whether your blaming would subject another to blame that she does
not deserve, or to blame beyond what she deserves—that is, whether you will violate NonExcess—depends on facts about the extent to which others have already contributed to the
amount of blame P deserves and how much others will contribute to the amount of blame P
deserves. Insofar as others have given the wrongdoer the amount of blame she deserves,
then one’s added act of blame would be wrong because of violating Non-Excess. Even if
others have not yet given her what she deserves but are about to give her the amount of
blame she deserves (for instance, just as you are about to blame), then this again would result
in your blaming being wrong. So, more precisely, the appropriateness of an act of blame
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depends on whether the contributions of others to the amount of blame P deserves would
render your added act of blame to be one that contributes to blame beyond what P deserves.
One feature that can make it the case that somebody is blamed beyond what she
deserves is the extent to which others have contributed, or will contribute, to the amount of
blame the person deserves. Suppose that, while seated on a train, Sanjay angrily berates
Jinsoo in a way that is immoral. We might think that the other passengers in the vicinity
ought to blame Sanjay, perhaps even think that it would be wrong for them not to blame
Sanjay.122 Once these neighboring passengers have blamed Sanjay, there is the further
question of to what extent it would be appropriate for other passengers in the train car to
blame Sanjay. Should the remaining passengers in other train cars now cross over into the
train car with Sanjay and proceed to blame him, and then, when he exits onto the platform,
should the remainder of the people on the platform, the turnstile attendant, and custodial
staff, blame him as well? And then, once he leaves the station, he passes the honey roasted
peanut vendor, the Halal food truck personnel, and several taxi-cab drivers waiting for
passengers: should they all blame him too? Answering these questions affirmatively is
implausible.
In the case of Twitter trials, the business is already aware that the employee has been
harshly blamed by thousands of people. The knowledge of this fact should provide strong
reason for the business to come to see that its added blame will be undeserved and thus
wrong. 123 There must be a limit to how much blame a person should be subjected to in

Note, this would be contrary to the received understanding of desert-claims that hold No Obligation.
Even readers—I have in mind those who espouse some version of T.M. Scanlon’s conception of blame that
understands blame in terms of altering relations—who find it implausible that blame is additive have good
reason to endorse my conclusion. What is important is that additional acts of blaming alter the context,
meaning, and significance of blame. And the meaning and significance of your act of blaming changes in
122
123
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response to the sorts of wrongdoing I am considering. To think that the blame one can be
subjected to is limitless in intensity and duration seems to undermine a fundamental aspect
of desert in blame; it renders unintelligible the notion that persons deserve certain amounts
of blame for certain acts.
One may object to the discussion thus far with the following counterexample:
Suppose Jeff insults Ross on Ross’s social media page. Many of Ross’s friends observe this
insult and subject Jeff to blame. Ross has not yet blamed Jeff. Does this mean that Ross
could not now blame Jeff? No. But nevertheless, the objection may illuminate a limit of my
argument.
I am assuming that the business is not the victim of the employee’s wrongdoing. We
might think victims of wrongdoing maintain special standing to express blame through
resentment regardless of the extent to which others have blamed the wrongdoer.124 This
would be just as true if the business were the victim of the employee’s wrongdoing. An
alternative would be to treat resentment as a distinct desert-object from indignation; that is,
while others may have already satisfied the desert-claim whose object is indignation, the
desert-claim whose object is resentment remains unfulfilled and can only be fulfilled by
victims of the wrongdoing. This too would be true if the business were the victim of the
employee’s wrongdoing.
It is now worth returning to an implication of the claim I make earlier in the
dissertation—that firing in response to a Twitter trial constitutes an expression of blame—to
illuminate possible boundaries of my argument. For my argument to work, the act of firing

response to what other people are doing. For Scanlon’s discussion of blame, see Moral Dimensions: Permissibility,
Meaning, Blame (Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2008).
124 Cohen, “Casting the First Stone: Who Can, and Who Can’t, Condemn the Terrorists?,” 2006.
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must be an expression of blame. If an employee acted immorally outside the workplace and
only the business was to learn of this conduct and were to covertly fire the employee in a way
that does not generate press and does not qualify as blame, my argument would not tell
against this (though there may be, I think, good moral standing related reasons for the
business not to fire the employee). So, the argument I have given in this dissertation is not
an argument against firing as such, but rather, against blaming inappropriately (which can be
expressed through firing). 125
Relatedly, if the business waited out the Twitter storm, so to speak, and then fired
the employee discreetly (through somehow cancelling the implicature that the employee is
being blamed through firing and not combining the firing with a condemnatory press
release) then this too would be something that my argument might allow for (insofar as the
business’s act of firing would not be an act of blame). 126 So, the business is not forever
joined at the hip with the employee once a Twitter trial occurs—the option to disassociate
may be available insofar as the firing does not take place in a context that would make it an
act of blame.127
Finally, suppose the marginal blame that the business adds through firing contributes
only an amount of blame up to and at most equal to what the employee deserves at the time
of firing. Firing the employee would nevertheless be morally reckless. This is because the
While my current concern is with outside of work immoral conduct, if my arguments end up holding force
for inside of work immoral conduct too, I would not see this as an unfortunate outcome. Still, some might
find it plausible that the business maintains special standing to blame through firing with respect to inside of
work conduct in a way similar to how victims of wrongdoing might maintain special standing to express
resentment.
126 It is worth noting that I am only discussing a limit on my thesis; I am not making a positive assertion in
support of firing. This is a bold enough claim that would require at least as much justification as the thesis I
defend.
127 There are other interesting questions in the vicinity. Could it be that a company that purports to respect its
employees has an obligation to stand up for, or protect its employee, let alone fire her? I cannot argue for this
thesis here, but it seems to me one that is worth exploring.
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business cannot control how much additional blame will fall upon the employee after the
firing. In other words, the firing may not be the final act of blame that hits the mark for
precisely how much blame is deserved. The act of firing is likely to generate further publicity
and may invite more blame, and in this sense, the business’s blame might very well have
been a part of the collective set of blaming acts that together exceed what the employee
deserves.
In this chapter, I have claimed that the additivity principle can provide nonconsequentialist reasons not to blame somebody who deserves blame since doing so would
wrong that person. The additivity principle provides the manager a strong reason to think
that his or her act of blaming through firing in response to a Twitter trial constitutes an
inappropriate act of blame. In the final chapter, I will explore the nature of the additivity
principle and its connection to the ethics of blame in greater detail.
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Chapter 5: On the Nature of the Additivity of Blame and the Ethics of
Blame
Introduction
At its core, the additivity principle follows from a well-acknowledged aspect of
blaming: it is a communal practice. What has not been adequately acknowledged is what this
means for prospective blamers.
The facts that communities come in different shapes and sizes and that they also can
change in shapes and sizes are normatively relevant features in thinking about the
appropriateness of blame. Like with other communal activities, blaming can involve
collective action or coordination problems. Blame gives rise to a distinct set of issues that are
less significant in the context of punishment; in state-imposed punishment, there are
established conventions about who may distribute punishment, when to distribute
punishment, and through what medium to distribute punishment. This is not so with blame:
individual blamers act without considering how the rest of the community is responding to a
wrongdoer and often fail to account for how their behavior contributes to the community’s
treatment of the wrongdoer. Embracing the additivity principle allows us, as individuals, to
be sensitive to the fact that blaming is a communal practice.
In this chapter, I aim to offer a more detailed characterization of the additivity
principle by discussing some of its implications, making some clarifications with respect to
how it relates to other moral concepts, and engaging with some objections. In doing so, I
hope to move us a small step closer to an understanding of the nature and ethics of our
blaming practices more generally.
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The Harms in Blame
The general point I make with the additivity principle resembles one Derek Parfit
makes in a different context:
“It is not enough to ask, ‘Will my act harm other people?’ Even if the answer is No,
my act may still be wrong, because of its effects. The effects that it would have when
it is considered on its own may not be its only relevant effects. I should ask, ‘Will my
act be one of a set of acts that will together harm other people?’ The answer may be
Yes.”128
Similarly, when deciding whether to blame, it is not enough to ask, “Does the person
deserve blame?” Even if the answer is “yes,” my blaming that person may still be wrong
when considered in view of whether and how much others are blaming. In deciding to
blame, it is not enough to ask whether the person deserves blame; one must also consider
whether and to what extent others are blaming.
One might object to my appealing to Parfit in this way. That is, Parfit is concerned
with harms brought about due to the joint effects of our acts, whereas the focus of our
discussion is blame. While this is of course correct, the critical underlying insight still
stands—the morality of an act is affected by what others do. Moreover, there is reason to
think that there are significant harms associated with blaming too.
Many philosophers recognize the fact that blame is harmful. Derk Pereboom notes,
“…often expressions of moral anger have harmful effects…Frequently expressions of moral
anger are intended to cause physical or emotional pain. Partly as a result of these problems,
moral anger often has a tendency to damage or destroy relationships. In extreme cases, it can
128

Derek Parfit, Reasons and Persons (Oxford Paperbacks, 1984), p. 86.
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provide motivation to take very harmful and even lethal action against another.”129 Roger
Wertheimer writes, “We reject condemnations of us, for they are rejections of us. The
condemned is cut off, cast down, distanced, dissociated, denied a proper station. Consider
what it means to condemn a building, declare it unsafe for folks to be around, and shut it off
from human society.”130 Lastly, Christopher Bennett notes, “Social animals as we are, it can
be tremendously distressing when others act as if we are not there, refuse to speak to us, or
act only rudely towards us. We are deprived of (at least part of) our place in the social world,
and for the vast majority of us, that is something tremendously important.” 131
While most philosophers acknowledge there are harms associated with blame,
Michael McKenna has argued that the harms associated with blame are not especially
significant. He grants that there are harms with overt blame due to “the negative emotions
associated with public sanctions and the like,” but seems to think that the harms are not
especially worrisome.132 In defending this view, McKenna contrasts the harms in blaming
with the harms in punishing, and notes, “In short, the harm in blaming, even at its most
extreme, is simply not nearly as severe as the harm that is possible in punishing nor are the
welfare interests that are threatened nearly as threatening to one’s overall well-being. For
example, unlike blame, punishment might expose one to the possibility of a shortened life,
absorbing physical pain, living in a less desirable social and physical environment, a
minimized level of financial security, and so on.”133 I find this a peculiar way to deflate
worries regarding the harshness of blame.
Derk Pereboom, “Free Will, Love and Anger,” Ideas Y Valores 141 (2009): 172. This citation is due to
McKenna, Conversation and Responsibility, 148.
130 Roger Wertheimer, “Constraining Condemning,” Ethics 108, no. 3 (1998): 494.
131 Bennett, “The Varieties of Retributive Experience,” 151; McKenna, Conversation and Responsibility, 139.
132 McKenna, Conversation and Responsibility, 142.
133 Ibid.
129
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I will discuss three worries with McKenna’s position. First, a problem with
McKenna’s thought that the upper limit in the harms associated with punishment is
significantly higher than the upper limit of the harms associated with blame is that on many
accounts of punishment, what it is for the state to punish an individual is to express societal
blame. If this is correct, the upper limit of the harms associated with punishment is just the
same as the upper limit of the harms associated with blame.
Putting this point aside, there is a further problem: McKenna’s analysis fails to make
an “apples-to-apples” comparison, so to speak—this is the second worry. He compares the
harms associated with a medium of punishment (e.g., incarceration, community service,
lashes, and so on) with the harms associated with being subjected to an expression of blame
(independent of its medium of expression), rather than with the harms associated with a
medium used to express blame (e.g., a tweet, frown, shout, firing, and so on), and it is not
clear this comparison is intelligible.
Perhaps the following two comparisons would be more intelligible: the first involves
comparing the harms associated with a particular medium of blame with the harms
associated with a particular medium of punishment, and the second involves comparing the
harms associated with being subjected to an expression of blame (independent of the
medium) with the harms associated with being subjected to punishment (independent of the
medium). But these comparisons are also problematic.
This is because there are likely strong interaction effects between the harm associated
with a particular medium used to express blame and the harm associated with the expression
of blame itself. Something similar holds true for punishment. Thus, it is difficult to speak in
general terms about the harms in an expression of blame without accounting for the medium
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that is used to convey the expression of blame.
I will now discuss the third worry with McKenna’s claim: pointing out that the harms
associated with punishment are more severe than the harms associated with blame is
unmoving. The fact that there is something worse than X says little about how bad X is in
the first place. While I am open to the possibility that the upper limit of the harms associated
with punishment, is greater than the harms associated with the upper limit of blame, this
does little for the fact that the harms associated with blame can be severe, indeed even when
it is below its upper limit.
Moreover, even if the upper limit on the harms associated with punishment is higher
than the upper limit on the harms associated with blame, there is still a significant range in
which the harms associated with both overlap, and a certain range in which the harms
associated with blame may very well be greater than the harms associated with punishment.
One of the important reasons McKenna underestimates the severity of the harms in
blame is that he fails to adequately consider the fact that there are many possible blamers, and
that the blaming could continue indefinitely. Being subjected to blame through firing in
response to a Twitter trial that has excited worldwide indignation can result in one no longer
finding work in one’s vocation, one having trouble forming new relationships 134, and one
having difficulty looking others in the eye; this together may be more harmful than when a
state punishes one by mandating a certain amount of hours of community service. Thus,
attempting to understand the harms associated with blame by comparing it to the harms
associated with punishment seems unhelpful.

For example, many nowadays learn about their dates prior to going on the date through an internet search.
Seeing that a prospective date has generated outrage from millions may disincline one to give that date a
chance. See Ronson, So You’ve Been Publicly Shamed, 2015, 80.
134
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To conclude this section, the harms associated with blame should not be
understated. Recent studies support the fact that a person who is the object of blame, in
virtue of the alienation and rejection that is fundamentally tied up in the practice of blaming,
might experience the blame as he or she would a physical harm. That is, certain social pains
are phenomenologically and physiologically akin to physical pains associated with assaults
and injuries. Psychologists Naomi Eisenberger and Matthew Lieberman state, “We have
recently proposed that physical pain—the pain experienced upon bodily injury—and social
pain—the pain experienced upon social injury…share neural and computational
mechanisms.”135 Other scholars have shown that painkiller medications such as Tylenol,
typically prescribed for physical pains, are similarly effective in reducing the severity of the
experience of social pains.136
When Justine Sacco learned that Sam Biddle (the Gawker journalist who displayed
her tweet to his many followers on Twitter and in effect initiated the Twitter trial) said that
he expected Sacco to be “fine eventually, if not already,” she stated,

“Well, I’m not fine, I’m really suffering. I had a great career and I loved my job and it
was taken away from me and there was a lot of glory in that. Everybody else was
very happy about that. I cried out my body weight in the first twenty-four hours. It
was incredibly traumatic. You don’t sleep. You wake up in the middle of the night

“Why Rejection Hurts: A Common Neural Alarm System for Physical and Social Pain,” Trends in Cognitive
Sciences 8, no. 7 (2004): 294.
136 C. Nathan DeWall et al., “Acetaminophen Reduces Social Pain: Behavioral and Neural Evidence,”
Psychological Science 21, no. 7 (2010): 931–37.
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forgetting where you are. All of a sudden you don’t know what you’re supposed to
do.”137

It is terribly difficult to be at the center of a Twitter trial, and we have good reason to think
one is seriously harmed as a result.138

Does the appropriateness of an act of blame depend on how others are acting?

One might object to the additivity principle as follows: “It is not that the
appropriateness of an act of blame depends on how much others are blaming, it simply
depends on whether the person (still) deserves blame. That is, blaming is inappropriate
because the person no longer deserves blame. No reference is needed to any other person.”
The objection is that the appropriateness of an act does not depend on how much others are
blaming, but it simply depends on whether it is still true that blame is deserved. This
objection is compelling, but ultimately off the mark. Two points in response.

Ronson, So You’ve Been Publicly Shamed, 2015, 79–80.
Another reason Twitter trials might be morally problematic pertains to equality understood as comparative
fairness. That is, it is sheer luck that a particular person is caught in a viral Twitter trial. Many have said, written,
or done, things that could easily have spurred a Twitter trial. And given how bad it is to be subjected to a
Twitter Trial, this luck factor becomes more important.
One might think that it does not matter that it was sheer luck that this person got caught in a Twitter trial.
For instance, in the case of speeding on the highway, it does little good to say to the police officer, “Well
everyone else was speeding too! It is sheer luck that I got caught.” However, one might think that the highwayspeeder getting penalized does get what he absolutely deserves, but that it is nonetheless comparatively
undeserved or unfair. To bring the point out, suppose the speed limit is 60mph and I am driving at 65mph. It
could be that, as a matter of absolute desert, I deserve some punishment. Nevertheless it seems to me that if I
was driving at 65mph, and everybody else was driving on the highway at 90mph, and it was only I that got
punished, as a matter of comparative unfairness, the unfairness is extremely bad. A similar analogy might hold
with regard to Twitter trials. If this is the case, those who are participating in the Twitter trial are contributing
to something bad because of how comparatively unfair it is. For more on equality as comparative unfairness,
see Larry S Temkin, Inequality (Oxford University Press, 1993).
137
138

89

First, the truth of the desert claim is often contingent on facts about other people
having already distributed the desert object. Consider the claim that “Peter deserves a
bonus.” This claim is not true across all times. At T 1…T4 it could be true, but not from
T5…Tn. What changed at T5? Peter’s manager gave him his bonus. This fact about how
another person has acted impacts whether the desert-claim is still true. Another person’s (the
manager) actions makes it the case that the present-tense desert claim is false (that is, at T5 it
is false that Peter deserves a bonus). Something similar holds when blame is the desertobject.
Second, there are cases in which what you should do depends on how others are
acting, even when the desert-claim remains true. This is so when multiple individuals are
independently deciding whether to blame a desert-subject at a given moment. If P1…Pn all
plan to blame Emma (who deserves blame) at T1, then whether you can permissibly blame
Emma at T1 depends on whether the summation of the amount of blame P1…Pn plan to
distribute is equal to or greater than the blame Emma deserves. If it is equal to or greater
than what she deserves, your decision to blame her at T1 would violate Non-Excess.
Importantly, such a case is compatible with the objection; it is true Emma deserves blame,
yet the appropriateness of your act depends on how others are acting.

How does additivity relate to proportionality and necessity?
Some might wonder how the additivity principle relates to the concepts of
proportionality and necessity. I will consider each of these concepts in turn.
Is the additivity principle merely an injunction to pay attention to proportionality?
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Proportionality relates to the additivity principle, but it is not identical with it. Before
clarifying this issue, I must first distinguish two senses of proportionality. The concept of
proportionality is used in different ways in theorizing about self-defense/war and in
theorizing about blame (and punishment).
In self-defense/war, the concept of proportionality—let’s call it
“proportionalitydefense”—is a forward-looking concept. It concerns a judgment that involves
comparing the consequences of performing a defensive act with not performing that act.139
It is a prospective requirement that focuses on comparing “the relevant bad effects that
defensive action (including war) would cause, either directly or indirectly, and the relevant
good effects that it would cause—in particular, the prevention of harms that would
otherwise be caused by others,” to the status quo state of affairs. 140
With respect to blame, the concept of proportionality, as it is usually employed, is a
backward-looking concept. Let’s call it “proportionalityretrospect.” It is retrospective because it
concerns comparing the nature of a past wrongdoing with the nature of the harm to be
imposed through an act of blame.141 It concerns the importance of ensuring that a
prospective blaming response stands in a “fitting” or “aptness” relation to the wrongdoing.
There is a long-standing debate around how to calculate proportionateretrospect responses to
wrongdoing that I will side-step. Importantly, proportionalityretrospect concerns the extent to
which a harm that is to be imposed on the wrongdoer through blaming “fits” the
wrongdoing.
For a defense of the view that proportionality does not merely pertain to consequentialist but also involves
accounting for various deontological principles see Jeff McMahan, “Proportionate Defense,” J. Transnat’l L. &
Pol’y 23 (2013): 29; Thomas Hurka, “Proportionality and Necessity,” in War: Essays in Political Philosophy, ed.
Larry May and Emily Crookston (Cambridge University Press, 2008).
140 McMahan, “Proportionate Defense,” 4. I should note that there are complicated questions concerning how
to understand the baseline counterfactual that one is making the comparison with respect to that I will ignore.
141 Ibid., 22.
139
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While the importance of making proportionalityretrospect judgments about an act of
blame is acknowledged in the literature, in my view, satisfying the proportionalityretrospect
requirement alone is inadequate. This is because satisfying the proportionality retrospect
requirement does not account for the fact that many individually proportionateretrospect acts
can subject someone to blame beyond what she deserves. The fact that many people can
blame a wrongdoer is a significant oversight in contemporary theories of blame and desert. 142
A series of proportionalretrospect acts can wrong the blame-recipient by subjecting her to blame
beyond what she deserves. If we want the following sentence to be intelligible—“I did not
deserve that much blame”—then we must account not just for individual
proportionalityretrospect, but also for the additivity principle.
Consider a case in which no blame has yet fallen upon the wrongdoer. On the
received understanding of the ethics of blame, the reasoning about what to do might go as
follows: so long as my act of blaming is an individually proportionateretrospect response to the
desert-subject’s wrongdoing (and I meet certain other conditions, for example, possessing
standing to blame), then it is appropriate for me to blame the wrongdoer. But the additivity
principle dictates that it is insufficient for me to consider the proportionalityretrospect of my act
of blaming: this is because even if my act is proportionateretrospect to the wrongdoing, if several
others were to blame (in a manner that might be individually proportionateretrospect responses
to wrongdoing), we might subject the desert-subject to blame beyond what she deserves. So,
the additivity principle requires us to consider how much others will blame. The additivity
principle is a nod to the fact that blaming is a communal practice.
A notable exception is Linda Razdik’s work. For her discussion of the effects of multiple blamers on
proportionality, see “Moral Rebukes and Social Avoidance,” Journal of Value Inquiry 48 (2014): 658. For a brief
mention of the effects of social media on proportionality, see her footnote number 19 in her “Gossip and
Social Punishment,” Res Philosophica 93, no. 1 (2016): 200.
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There is a different concept in the self-defense/war literature that is also worth
considering in relation to the additivity principle—namely, the requirement of necessity.
Bombings: Suppose a country will drop a small bomb on a city. Further suppose
doing so satisfies proportionalitydefense because the net-good (or bad) that comes
about due to it (perhaps because it is sufficient to avert the achievement of the unjust
cause) is significantly greater than the net-good (or bad) that comes about due to not
dropping the bomb. However, if every country made (and acted on) this judgment
about dropping the small bomb on the city, this would clearly be a mistake.
It would be a mistake because it fails to satisfy the requirement of necessity, among other
reasons.
One worry with appealing to necessity in the context of blame is that it is not clear
that blame is ever necessary.143 The worry is that employing the concept of necessity would
prove too much with respect to blame. This is because the claim that “blame is never
necessary” captures the thought that blaming is not obligatory. Let’s call this sense of
necessity, “necessityobligatory”. While necessityobligatory might not apply in relation to blame
insofar as blame is never obligatory, there are other senses of necessity that may fare better.
Seth Lazar notes, “In ordinary English, for H to be necessary to avert T, it must be
impossible to avert T without H.”144 Let’s call the ordinary language sense of necessity,
“necessityordinary.” So, later bombings would not be necessaryordinary, because when an act is
I will not take a stance on whether it is never necessary; such a claim would require significantly more
argumentation. For a prominent recent defense of the view that we ought to do away with some of the hostile
attitudes associated with blame, especially anger, see Martha C Nussbaum, Anger and Forgiveness: Resentment,
Generosity, Justice (Oxford University Press, 2016).
144 Seth Lazar, “Necessity in Self‐Defense and War,” Philosophy & Public Affairs 40, no. 1 (2012): 14.
143

93

overdetermined, as it is by hypothesis, it is not necessaryordinary. This follows simply from
what it means for some outcome to be overdetermined. Necessityordinary, however, is widely
agreed to be an inadequate conception of necessity with respect to an ethics of selfdefense/war because in defense contexts, “different options have different prospects of
success and involve different incidental harms.”145 The concept of necessity—let’s call it
“necessitydefense”—in self-defense/war involves comparisons between various available means
of achieving a defensive goal.146
Roughly, the requirement of necessitydefense is violated when there is a means of
achieving a defensive goal that is at least as likely to be achieved but is less harmful or bad.147
The added bombings would also violate necessitydefense. This is because, for later bombings,
there is a less bad alternative just as likely to secure the defensive aim—namely, not dropping
the bomb.148 In Bombings, as with necessityordinary, violating necessitydefense would stem from
the success of the defensive aim being overdetermined with added bombings.
It is not immediately clear how to conceptualize necessitydefense (or for that matter
necessityordinary) with respect to blame for two important reasons. First, while scholars
working in self-defense take pains to make clear that the standing presumption is that one
cannot physically attack another, and even in the face of a threat, one must meet certain
Ibid., 15.
Necessitydefense and proportionalitydefense are closely related but are still distinct. If in Bombings, there was
an even smaller bomb that would have been sufficient to avert the achievement of the unjust cause with just as
much likelihood, then necessitydefense would have been violated even though proportionality defense would have
been satisfied.
147 While I think this statement of necessity will suffice for our current purposes, it is worth noting that the
topic is significantly more complex. For various counterexamples to this notion of necessity see Lazar,
“Necessity in Self‐Defense and War”; Jeff McMahan, “The Limits of Self-Defense,” in The Ethics of Self-Defense,
ed. Christian Coons and Michael Weber (New York: Oxford University Press, 2016).
148 It would also be disproportionate
defense because the net-good that comes about due to dropping the bomb is
far outweighed by the net good that comes about due to not dropping the bomb.
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demanding requirements (of which necessitydefense and proportionalitydefense are crucial to
satisfy, and often difficult to satisfy) for physically attacking another in defense to be
permissible, scholars in the blame literature do not seem to go to great lengths to caution
against blaming.
Many scholars in the blame literature presume in favor of blaming in response to
wrongdoing. For example, McKenna states, “Absent any defeaters, the presumption is that
the (potential) blamer is normatively warranted just because the agent blamed is
blameworthy.”149 Maura Priest, notes, “It is…uncontroversial, in the usual circumstances,
that wronged parties can aptly blame their wrongdoer.”150 Others think blaming is something
that we have a right to do: “That there is a right to blame is an assumption that [R. Jay]
Wallace, [Macalaster] Bell, and others in the literature (e.g. Smith, 2007) seem to share.”151 It
seems clear that many in the literature think blame is an appropriate response to
wrongdoing, and do not speak of it is as something that must first meet an especially
demanding set of moral requirements. This makes it such that many blame theorists are
unlikely to see necessitydefense as a relevant requirement, since the presumption in response to
wrongdoing seems in favor of blaming, rather than seeing blame as something that should
only be done as a last resort.
The second reason it is difficult to conceptualize necessitydefense in blaming contexts is
that it is not obvious what the defensive goal of blame is. One possibility is offered by
Christopher Evan Franklin. He argues, “blame is essential to defending and protecting the

Conversation and Responsibility, 28.
“Blame After Forgiveness,” Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 19, no. 3 (2016): 619
151 Kyle Fritz and Daniel Miller, “Hypocrisy and the Standing to Blame,” 19.
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objects that give rise to moral values.”152 So, the defensive aim of blame might be to protect
objects (“humans, nature, and animals are among the valuable objects at the heart of
morality”153) that generate moral values. A critical question is, protecting from what? In
Franklin’s view, it is protecting them from freely performed acts of wrongdoing, which on
his view, express that the object in question is less valuable or not valuable.
However, the wrongdoing has already happened so it is not clear how necessitydefense,
a prospective requirement, is applicable. Perhaps then, the thought is that, while the
wrongdoing and expressive disvaluation have already happened, the threat of the expressive
disvaluation succeeding in actually disvaluing the object remains. I will refer to this threat as,
“the threat of disvaluation.”154
Franklin correctly recognizes the importance of answering the question of why
defending against the threat of disvaluation must “go beyond sadness and grief to the dark
attitude of blame.”155 For if non-reactive emotions will avert the threat of disvaluation just as
well, then blame would fail to satisfy necessitydefense. He offers the following example as an
illustration of why he considers blaming to be an essential response to the threat of
disvaluation:
“In experiencing and expressing blame toward me for insulting your wife, you too
are expressing a judgment concerning her value. In particular you are standing up for
Franklin, “Valuing Blame,” 2013, 213.
Ibid., 216.
154 One significant worry with applying the self-defense concepts of necessity
defense and proportionalitydefense in
the context of blaming is that the success conditions are unclear. In other words, what would it look like for
the objects that give rise to moral values to be “defended and protected” successfully. In self-defense contexts, it
is reasonably clear when the threat has been averted. This is not so with the threat of disvaluations. And some
scholars think that the likelihood of success is another requirement for defensive action. See Daniel Statman,
“On the Success Condition for Legitimate Self-Defense,” Ethics 118, no. 4 (2008): 659–86.
155 Franklin, “Valuing Blame,” 2013, 217.
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your wife and defending her value in the face of a challenge, making clear that you
value her and that my actions are inconsistent with her value as a person. Moreover,
by responding in this way, you are protecting your wife’s value. You are making it
clear to her and others that she is of value, and this is the first step in protecting her
from further mistreatment…To fail to blame me would be to fail to take your wife
seriously, implying that what I did was “no big deal.”” 156
This is puzzling. If one’s wife, after being insulted, turns to one and says, “Just ignore him.
Let’s get out of here,” it would be odd if defending her from the threat of disvaluation
nevertheless required one to blame the insulter. If one were to ignore one’s wife’s request
and still blamed, she might appropriately become irritated. She might say, “My value didn’t
need protecting; your blaming him was decidedly unnecessarydefense. More than that, your
failing to take seriously that I asked you not to confront him was disrespectful.” Moreover,
there are many people whose comments and behavior we should not gratify with a response.
Not acknowledging an insult is often a far more fitting response to the insult—it can
sometimes even deflate the insult of its force. Responding with the negative reactive
sentiments to an insult may very well be an acknowledgement of the insult’s plausibility.
If blaming in response to the threat of disvaluation is simply posited to be
necessarydefense to avert the threat, as it seems Franklin does, then this is a trivial result.157
Moreover, it is a result that simultaneously deflates the concept of necessity defense. Positing
Christopher Evan Franklin, “Valuing Blame,” Blame: Its Nature and Norms (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
2012), 2013, 218.
157 To be fair to Franklin, his discussion is not explicitly in the context of trying to make sense of self-defense
concepts in relation to blaming. But the task he is concerned with—investigating why blame is valuable and
good, despite its harsh features, especially when there are other less harsh responses to wrongdoing available—
fundamentally parallels the kinds of considerations that are relevant to questions concerning proportionality
and necessity in self-defense. Moreover, he does explicitly speak of “defending” and “protecting” in his
discussion.
156
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blame’s necessitydefense in response to the threat of disvaluation eliminates the need to make
comparisons between possible responses to the threat, an essential component of the
requirement of necessitydefense. Importantly, there are comparisons to be made.
Franklin’s account fails to accommodate the possibility that one can engage another
in a rational discussion concerning the wrongness of the act rather than blame the person.
One can protect what one values through rational discourse and persuasion without having
to bring on board the negative features of blaming. Sadness, regret, guilt, confusion and
other non-hostile responses to wrongdoing are also available. It is important to recognize
that not all threats of disvaluation ought to be treated equally. Many threats of disvaluation
will simply fall flat; others will be unsuccessful because the person who was threatened with
the expressive disvaluation has high self-assuredness, self-security, and so on. Blaming, in
many circumstances, will not satisfy necessitydefense with respect to the threat of disvaluation.
The important feature of attacking in defense is that if there is no necessitydefense, then
it is not an act of justified defense, but rather, it is an impermissible act. I propose something
similar is true of blame. In justifying blame, theorists sometimes point to the need to defend
certain communal moral values. Yet in defending these communal values through blaming,
we often forget to consider whether our response to wrongdoing is a defensive response or
whether it is a response that wrongs. The additivity principle helps one be attune to the fact
that one’s act of blame may be unnecessarydefense. The line between blaming to defend values
when a person deserves blame and wronging by blaming someone beyond what she deserves
is perhaps a thin one, but of significant moral consequence.
Consider the following situation as an illustration of the additivity principle and its
relation to the concepts of necessity and proportionality:
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Eager Physicians: On a transatlantic flight, a cabin-crew member announces a
request for any available medical personnel. Several doctors on the flight proceed to
the galley to help. A passenger is in anaphylaxis due to reacting to peanut particles
from the refreshments distributed moments ago. The passenger requires one dose of
epinephrine. The flight has several epi-pens in the first aid kit.

Now, suppose the enthusiastic physicians all believe the following: “this person needs
epinephrine.” Each of them believe that an EpiPen injection would be a
“proportionateretrospect” response to anaphylaxis. Should all of them administer an EpiPen?
This clearly would be a mistake. This is because additional doses of epinephrine are
unnecessarydefense (and unecessaryordinary). Each of the physician’s judgment about whether it
would be appropriate to administer an epi-pen depends on whether the other physicians are
doing so.
Suppose after one of the physicians administers the epi-pen, another physician on
the flight (a physician who disregards the “additivity principle of EpiPen”) injects the person
with another dose of epinephrine. In such a case, the physician is not only failing to help the
person, but she would also be assaulting the person (in the same way as if you or I were to go
up to some unknown person on the street and send epinephrine coursing through his or her
body.)
One may object that whether the physician should inject epinephrine does not
depend on how other doctors are acting; it simply depends on whether the person still
requires epinephrine. In other words, the objection would be that the doctors need not pay
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attention to the “additivity principle of EpiPens.” This is not quite right. The physicians
should consider additivity, since without doing so, all the physicians might simultaneously
inject the person with the “right” amount of epinephrine, but this would together subject the
anaphylactic patient to a fatal dose.
With respect to blaming on social media, Jon Ronson’s characterization seems apt:
when blame on social media is “delivered like remotely administered drone strikes nobody
needs to think about how ferocious our collective power might be. The snowflake never
needs to feel responsible for the avalanche.”158 Paying attention to the additivity principle
means that some of us can step back. When we call for wrongdoers to account for their
conduct through blaming, the additivity principle requires us to acknowledge that there may
be limits to the number of people who can permissibly conduct the audit.

Other-Defense Cases
Suppose there is a person with a pistol raised and credibly threatening to shoot and
kill five innocents. In most plausible theories of self-defense (more precisely, theories of
other-defense), if I was walking by and observed this, I would be justified in shooting to kill
the threatener. Similarly, if I could avert the threat by swinging a bat at the threatener’s knees
and gaining control of the weapon, shooting an arrow at that threatener, or taking some such
other incapacitating measure to neutralize the threat, I would be justified in doing so. I also
would be justified in tackling the threatener, tying him up, and so on. If performing these
latter options that are less harmful than killing the threatener ensures that he would no
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Jon Ronson, So You’ve Been Publicly Shamed (Picador, 2015), 56.
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longer pose a fatal threat to five innocents, I should do the least harmful of these options
rather than killing the person.
The reason I bring up the various ways in which one might respond to the threatener
is to illuminate something distinctive about the wrong in blame. What are the ways in which
one is justified in acting to prevent wrongful blame from falling upon another? I would not
be justified in shooting prospective wrongful blamers, just so that they do not blame a
person beyond what she deserves. Nor would I be justified in shoving them, or kidnapping
them, or taping their mouths to prevent them from blaming. I may not even be justified in
stepping on their toes to prevent them from blaming. If they are blaming through firing, I
am not justified in destroying the employer’s head-quarters. If they are blaming on the
internet, I am not justified in planting a virus on their computers or disabling their routers.
This brings us to an interesting feature of blame. While it is wrong for a person to
blame someone beyond what she deserves, there is little that others are entitled to do to
prevent this wrong from happening. This is unlike typical cases discussed in theorizing about
other-defense. With wrongful blame, I cannot justifiably do much to protect another person
from it besides (a) blaming the wrongful blamer, (b) expressing non-reactive attitudes, or (c)
using rational persuasion to get the prospective wrongful blamer not to blame. With respect
to (a), we might think that a person’s having the intention to subject another to wrongful
blame is wrong and deserves blame. Blaming such persons might get them to change their
minds about blaming, perhaps through blame’s “proleptic mechanism.”159 With respect to
(b), expressing sadness, regret, and so on, would be justified if it prevents the person from
wrongfully blaming. With respect to (c), we might also persuade the prospective blamer of
Bagley Benjamin, “Properly Proleptic Blame,” Ethics, forthcoming; Fricker, “What’s the Point of Blame? A
Paradigm Based Explanation,” 2014.
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the wrongness in blaming someone beyond what she deserves using the kinds of arguments
I have discussed in this dissertation and through other modes of rational persuasion.
We may be limited to (a)-(c) until we learn more from science about the nature of the
harm in blaming. As stated earlier in this chapter, psychologists Naomi Eisenberger and
Matthew Lieberman have shown that social pains are instantiated in the body in the same
way as bodily harms, and that pain-killer medication is effective with respect to alleviating
these social pains just as they are with bodily harms. If the findings of these scientists are
correct, this has puzzling implications: If blaming another has morally analogous
physiological effects in the blame recipient as a physical assault, then just as we are justified
in shoving a person to prevent that person from physically assaulting an innocent, are we
justified in shoving a person to prevent that person from wrongfully blaming another? It
seems far-fetched to think that harms caused by social injuries, as real as they may be, would
justify third-party intervention through physical means. Nevertheless, we would need some
explanation of why we ought to treat preventing harms due to blame differently from
preventing similar harms due to physical injury.
One might think that the fact that little can be done by third-parties to prevent
someone from wrongfully blaming another—one might not even be justified in flicking a
person to prevent that person from wrongfully blaming another—shows that the wrong in
blaming someone beyond what she deserves is a minor one. I think this is not the correct
lesson. I think it is seriously wrong, for example, to blame the housekeeper for stealing one’s
watch when the housekeeper did not do so. Indeed, wrongfully blaming the housekeeper for
stealing one’s watch may be worse than flicking the housekeeper’s arm. It is not that the
wrong in blaming is minor. Rather, it is that there are different considerations that matter
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with respect to what third parties can permissibly do to prevent the wrongful blame from
falling upon someone. We can simultaneously assert that blaming a person who does not
deserve blame or blaming a person beyond what she deserves is seriously wrong, without
having to assert that others are justified in preventing this wrong from occurring through the
kinds of means that they may be justified in using to prevent an unjustified physical harm.

Bernard Williams Style Cases

Suppose a wrongdoer has already been subjected to the amount of blame she deserves.
Any further acts of blame would be wrong. However, you have good reason to believe that if
you do not blame her, then others will subject the wrongdoer to blame far beyond the amount
of blame she would be subjected to were you to blame her.
This is a difficult situation. Since the wrongdoer has already received the amount of
blame she deserves, if you blamed her, you would act wrongly because of Non-Excess. If you
fail to blame her, others will violate Non-Excess, but much more egregiously; others will
subject the wrongdoer to blame far beyond what she deserves, and importantly, far beyond
what she would be subjected to were you to blame her.
This situation resembles a case Bernard Williams employs to demonstrate how
following the prescriptions of consequentialism can undermine one’s integrity. The case goes
as follows: a man is told that unless he kills a specified innocent person, twenty innocent
people will be killed, including that specified innocent person.160 The choice set involves
doing what is wrong versus being causally involved in allowing some far greater wrong to
Bernard Williams, “A Critique of Utilitarianism,” in Utilitarianism: For and Against (Cambridge University
Press, 1973), 77–135.
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come about, including the wrong one would have done. Williams’s thought is that if one
must opt for the choice favored by consequentialism—that is, performing a wrongful act P
to prevent some greater wrongful acts Q from coming about (where Q includes P)—this
would be crippling to one’s integrity.
Similarly, while you would act wrongly by blaming a person beyond what she
deserves, if you fail to do so, you would allow that person to be subjected to a much greater
amount of wrongful blame. While I will not answer what one ought to do in Williams’s case,
or the Williams style framing of a blaming scenario, I will try to illustrate some of the unique
dimensions of blame that such a case makes salient.
Things become complicated when we consider blaming through firing. Suppose
Elizabeth has three employers—Alpha Corp., Beta Corp., and Gamma Corp. Elizabeth is
working multiple jobs to make ends meet. Suppose a Twitter trial has erupted in response to
Elizabeth’s allegedly immoral conduct. Further suppose that Elizabeth has already been
subjected to the amount of blame she deserves by the Twitter trial participants. The
managers at Beta Corp. and Gamma Corp. plan to blame Elizabeth through firing, unless
Alpha Corp. fires her. But Elizabeth’s manager at Alpha Corp. correctly believes that
blaming through firing would be wrong since it would blame Elizabeth beyond what she
deserves.161
Elizabeth might plead with the manager at Alpha Corp., “Please fire me! I need these
other jobs. If you don’t blame me through firing, both of my other employers will blame me
through firing!” This seems to be a powerful reason to fire. Would the employer still be
While the case I have offered resembles the Williams case, it is distinct in that the firing is not
overdetermined in quite the same way as the death of the innocent in Williams’s case. This is because if Alpha
Corp. decides not to fire, while the employee will be fired from Beta Corp. and Gamma Corp., the employee
still has her job with Alpha Corp.
161
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blaming wrongly? The employer would seem to violate the moral prescriptions of NonExcess (not blaming someone beyond what she deserves). However, if you were not to
blame her through firing, and her other two employers fired her, she might complain, “If
you were simply not so self-centered about preserving a pristine moral record, then I would
still have my other two jobs.” The possibility of such a response seems to feature powerfully
in what the manager ought to do.
There might be some reason to think that when blame is invited by a person, it is no
longer blame; thus, Alpha Corp. would not be wrongfully expressing blame (though it would
still be firing). This, however, gets me into trouble. In Chapter 3, I argued that the act of
firing is an expression of blame independent of the intentions of the actor. Alpha Corp.’s
firing of Elizabeth would still be recognized as an act of blame. Moreover, convincing Beta
Corp and Gamma Corp. not to blame through firing may require the firing to be understood
as an act of blame. Thus, it may be a mistake to claim that because Elizabeth is inviting the
blaming through firing from Alpha Corp., it is no longer an act of blame.
A better understanding of the situation would be as follows: Whether the act of
firing is an expression of blame is not something that an idiosyncratic arrangement can
override. Nevertheless, we might think that there is a further question about how this added
act of blame should be understood as contributing to the amount of blame the wrongdoer
deserves. I will now turn to this issue.

The Amount of Blame a Wrongdoer Deserves
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An assumption in the discussion thus far has been that there is a certain amount of
blame a person deserves for a wrongdoing. What I have not touched on are the different
routes through which one might arrive at the amount of blame a person deserves, or the
different factors that impact the extent of the contribution of an act of blame to the amount
of blame a person is subjected to. A full exploration of this topic is outside the scope of this
project, but I will nevertheless touch on the kinds of things that can affect contributions to
the amount of blame a person is subjected to.
One factor that impacts how an act of blame contributes, morally speaking, to the
amount of blame a person deserves is the extent to which the wrongdoer welcomes the
blame to prevent some greater wrong from falling upon her. We might think that if Alpha
Corp. fired Elizabeth, since Elizabeth was inviting the blaming through firing to prevent
Beta Corp. and Gamma Corp. from wronging her, Alpha Corp.’s blame would not accrue to
the amount of blame Elizabeth deserves (or would be accrued at some significantly
discounted rate).
I think it is plausible that the blame Alpha Corp. distributes through firing should
not count toward the total amount of blame Elizabeth is subjected to. This is in part because
Alpha Corp.’s blaming is somehow inauthentic when it is so fervently desired and invited by
Elizabeth. One reason we might think that Alpha Corp.’s blaming should not enter the
calculus about how much blame Elizabeth has been subjected to is that other moral practices
associated with wronging another do not seem apt. For example, apology and forgiveness do
not seem appropriate with respect to Elizabeth and Alpha Corp. It would be odd if after
pleading with Alpha Corp. to fire her, Elizabeth were to demand an apology from Alpha
Corp. for blaming her through firing. Moreover, there are other instances of blaming we
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might think should not accrue toward the amount of blame a wrongdoer is subjected to,
despite thinking that they are still acts of blame. For example, if children were to blame a
wrongdoer, we might think that their acts of blaming do not contribute, for moral purposes,
to the amount of blame the wrongdoer is subjected to, but still think that they are acts of
blame.
In addition to (1) whether the wrongdoer invited the blame to avoid being subjected
to some greater wrong (as in the case involving Elizabeth and Alpha Corp.), several
additional factors may bear on the amount of blame an act contributes: (2) the duration of
the blaming, (3) the number of blamers, (4) the type of hard treatment (5) the publicity of
the expression of blame, and (6) the nature of the relation between the blamer and desertsubject. So, we might think of the amount of blame a person is subjected by an act is some
function of (1), (2), (3), (4), (5), and (6). (I do not mean to suggest that these considerations
exhaust the variables that would go into the function of how much blame a person is
subjected to.) I will briefly discuss some of these variables in this function, though in doing
so, I will admittedly raise more questions than I will provide answers. My hope is that raising
these questions will be an important first step toward illuminating just how complex the
topic of blame is and how much more research is needed on the topic.
The question of how to understand the duration of the blaming (that is, (2)) is a
difficult question. For instance, in Twitter trial contexts, is the duration of the blaming only
the discrete moment at which a blamer publishes her Tweet that condemns the wrongdoer,
or is it how long the condemnatory Tweets remains on the internet? Both options seem
implausible. We might instead think of its duration as lasting as long as the tweet retains its
expressive force, however we might cash that out. What about the business’s blaming
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through firing? The act of firing happens in one moment. But its blaming significance seems
to last longer. Perhaps the duration of the blaming through firing might be understood as
lasting until the employee secures another source of employment. But this too is
problematic; an employee at the end of her career may simply choose to retire. How to
understand the duration of an act of blame raises difficult and unresolved questions about
the metaphysics of blame. The important point is that, other things being equal, the duration
of the blaming seems to impact positively the amount of blame a person is subjected to.
(3), the number of blamers who have already blamed also seems to affect the amount
of blame a person is subjected to. There are two features worth noting regarding the number
of blamers. Other things being equal, we might think that if there have been n instances of
blame, the n+1th act of blaming contributes less to the amount of blame the wrongdoer is
subjected to than the nth instance of blaming. This captures the thought that the marginal
contribution of blaming acts decreases with each additional act of blaming. With honors,
scarcity is thought to make the honor more valuable. The flip side of the coin is, with
blaming, there might be some reason to think that when there is an abundance of blamers,
each act of blaming contributes less to the amount of blame than the previous act of blame.
On the other hand, an important dimension of blaming another is thought to be that
it alienates the wrongdoer from the community. An n+1th instance of blaming has an
alienating effect greater than the nth instance of blaming. As more members of the
community subject you to blame, the more you are alienated, and we might think that this
alienating dimension relates positively to the amount of blame to which a wrongdoer is
subjected. So, we might think that even though in Twitter trial contexts the relation with a
blamer on the internet may be minimal and the millionth person to blame you contributes
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less blame than the tenth person to blame you, the alienation effect with later acts of
blaming may be more significant. Alienating a person is among the most serious responses
communities have in response to wrongdoing. Importantly, there is no particular person that
decides when to bring about this alienation effect. It simply happens as the number of
members in the community who distance themselves from the wrongdoer through blaming
increases.
With (4), it seems clear that the hardness of the treatment through which blame is
expressed matters for how much blame an act contributes (as discussed at the start of this
chapter in relation to Michael McKenna’s views regarding the harms in blaming). Expressing
blame through a frown or a passive aggressive silence is likely to contribute less to the
amount of blame a person is subjected to than expressing blame through firing. The
business’s treatment in firing can be harsh: the employee is deprived of his or her means,
community, and vocation.
The hardness of the treatment matters because it is bad in and of itself, but it also
makes the expressed blame more noticeable and salient. If the blamer wants her blame to be
heard with a high probability, then she will express it through some unquestionably harsh
treatment. There is some room for blame not to be heard with a frown or a cold shoulder
which also allows for some plausible deniability. With less harsh mediums through which
one might express blame, the person might not notice or might simply attribute the
treatment to something entirely apart from blame. Thus, the hardness of the treatment
makes the blame more salient; it is akin to a dye that illuminates various parts of a cell. So, we
might think that amount of blame an act contributes is also a function of the salience of that
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act. There is also the plain point that some hard treatments will be conventionally
understood as a more intense expression of blame.162
(5), how publicly the blame is expressed seems to have a positive impact on the
contribution of an act of blame too. In other words, when acts of blame are performed in
public venues, we might think that the amount of blame contributed is greater than had
similar acts of blame been performed in a non-public venue. (This of course also relates to
the point regarding salience in the past paragraph). So, an act of blaming through firing,
when coupled with a press release, may contribute more to the amount of blame a person is
subjected to than an act of blaming through firing that that is not coupled with a press
release. Given we are social creatures, the more public an act of blame is, the more it may
contribute to the amount of blame.
(6), the relation of the blamer to the wrongdoer also raises interesting problems.
Blame, even the most delicately delivered blame, might fall on one like the weight of many
thousands of acts of blame, when delivered by one’s mother. On the other hand, a similar
act of blame by a distant third-party might contribute only a minor amount of blame, other
things being equal. Additionally, the length of the relationship might matter. If an employee
is blamed through firing after only one week of working at the firm, this act of firing may
contribute less to the amount of blame a person is subjected to than had the person worked
at the firm for decades.
While this discussion moved quickly, the point I am making is simple: acts of blame
can contribute differentially to the total amount of blame to which a wrongdoer is subjected.
It also should be clear that there is much more research to be done on the factors that
162
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impact a particular act of blame’s contribution to the amount of blame a wrongdoer is
subjected to.

Concluding Remarks
Suppose that the appropriateness of an act of blame does not depend on how much
others blame—that is, suppose the additivity principle were false. In other words, whether
an act of blame is appropriate in no way depended on whether (or the extent to which) the
person in question has already received blame. (This does not mean there are no other things
that might nevertheless make blaming inappropriate, for example, standard consequentialist
considerations and standing related considerations). If the additivity principle were false, this
would imply that one wrongdoing, however major or however minor, can subject a person
to blame from a limitless number of people for an indefinite amount of time.
Such a community is constituted with members with no grip on, awareness of, or
interest in whether their acts of blame would subject a person to wrongful blame beyond
what she deserves. This world is the one that many contemporary theories of blame and
desert allow for. There is another world we might consider, one in which we encourage
individual actors to recognize their being situated in a community, and understand that the
appropriateness of blaming depends on how other members of the community are acting—
this is a world that embraces the additivity principle.
To put the point simply: whether you should blame depends on how others are
acting. There are cases in which the additivity principle would tell you not to do something
even if it is proportionate for you to do so as an individual. Another way to think about the
additivity principle is that it is a sort of global proportionality—just because an act is
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proportionate for you to do (if no one else on the planet but you and the wrongdoer
existed), the fact that there are other people who exist who also might blame, of course
should affect what one should do. The additivity principle is one that we, as individuals,
should pay attention to so that we, as a community, do not commit injustices. It is a sort of
warning for us to pay attention to how our act might influence the aggregate impact of our
community on another member of the community.
There is no invisible hand of blame. We do not arrive at the right amount of blame
through a natural process as we might a state, market, or other evolutionary process. 163
Another way to think about what I have been arguing for is this: because there is no invisible
hand to bring us to the appropriate amount of blame, we must each, as individuals, pay
attention to our role in helping the community avoid subjecting another member of the
community to wrongful blame. Unfortunately, many regard blame as though it is the kind of
thing that can be explained through an invisible hand process—where each person blames as
she sees fit and that the appropriate amount of blame will somehow come about. Our moral
theories cannot act as if there is only one possible person who can perform the act. The fact
that there are many possible candidates for performing an act of blame gives certain kinds of
reasons to everybody. It gives reasons to recognize that our being part of a moral
community matters in deciding how to act.
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APPENDIX

Marilyn Friedman’s Account of Responsible Blaming
Marilyn Friedman is one of the few scholars who has attempted to articulate a set of
conditions in response to the question of “how to express blame responsibly.” 164 So, I want
to briefly discuss her account. My purpose is not to conduct a full engagement with her
account, but rather, to focus on one aspect of her account that is problematic. I will start
with a brief characterization of her account.
Friedman aptly notes,
“[I]n addition to asking what conditions a person should meet to be a legitimate
recipient of blame, we should also ask what conditions a person should meet to
engage responsibly in the act of morally blaming others…If the recipient of blame
must meet certain criteria to be blameworthy, does not the blamer have to meet
certain criteria to be blamer-worthy?” 165
The point is that blame can have certain unseemly and harsh dimensions, so one ought to
wield it with care.
On Friedman’s account, for an agent to blame another responsibly, the act of
blaming must meet at least the following three necessary conditions: “warrant, commitment,
and responsiveness.”166 The Warrant condition concerns one’s justification in thinking that
“the wrongdoing really occurred, the blame recipient did it, and the blame recipient was a
Friedman, “How to Blame People Responsibly,” 271.
“How to Blame People Responsibly,” p. 272.
166 Ibid., 272.
164
165
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morally competent agent.”167 The Commitment condition requires one “to comply with the
specific moral norms to which one holds others.”168 Last, the Responsiveness condition
requires that the blamer have an “openness to dialogue with the blame recipient about the
blame charges and flexibility in being able to adjust one’s blame if appropriate as a result of
that dialogue.”169 On Friedman’s account, these three conditions are necessary conditions
but are not exhaustive or jointly sufficient conditions for responsible blaming.
There is much I find attractive about Friedman’s account. However, her
responsiveness condition is worrisome. In describing the responsiveness condition,
Friedman states, “A blame recipient may deny having done the act of which she is accused,
offer excuses or justifying reasons, argue that she was not morally responsible for her
behavior under the circumstances, or…challenge the authority or standing of the blamer to
blame her.”170 The trouble, however, is that the responsiveness condition pertains to conduct
after the blaming has already occurred. Thus, it is not clear how “responsiveness” could be a
necessary condition for responsible blaming.
Moreover, once the wrongdoer has gotten the amount of blame she deserves, the
mere fact that the blame recipient is afforded an opportunity to respond to the blame (and
the blamer could then potentially acknowledge that the instance of blaming in question was
unjustified) does little because the blame recipient was already wronged. The wrong would
occur at the moment the blame recipient is blamed beyond what she deserves; in other
words, the moment Non-Excess is violated. That the blamer can come to see that the
Ibid., 274.
Ibid.
169 Ibid.
170 Ibid., 275.
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168
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blame was misplaced through a dialog with the blame recipient, and the blame recipient has
a voice in the dialog, does little for the fact that the blamer thought that the blame recipient
was the sort of person who would do that wrongful conduct in question and wronged the
blame recipient through blaming her when she did not deserve blame.171
Friedman suggests an analogy between the blame dialog associated with her
responsiveness condition and a court hearing. She suggests, “The blame may not be
deserved, and until it is confirmed through a dialogue that allows the recipient to reply to the
charges, there is a sense in which the blame recipient is presumptively “innocent before the
moral law” and owed a hearing.”172 But since this “hearing” is scheduled after the blaming
has already occurred, to extend the analogy, the blame recipient has already served her
sentence (or is already serving her sentence), and one is deciding after the fact whether she
should have served it (or should be serving it) in the first place. The wrong has already been
done.
Even if one is sympathetic to Friedman’s responsiveness condition as a requirement
for responsible blaming, such a condition is especially problematic in the context of a
business blaming through firing. Once the firm has blamed the employee through firing, it is
much more difficult to provide the target of blame an opportunity to respond to or
challenge the criticism and engage the blamer (the firm) in a conversation. The employee

While my primary concern in this dissertation has been with acts that are under our voluntary control, there
might be something to be said for us to reduce even instances of involuntary, unexpressed, blame. Beyond the
well-rehearsed therapeutic reasons for reducing the incidence of reactive attitudes within oneself, there may be
moral reasons to reduce unexpressed blame too. Perhaps this is due to the possibility that unexpressed blame
might instantiate itself behaviorally in subtle and difficult to perceive ways in how we treat the person. It strikes
me as plausible that we should strive to reduce (somehow) the presence of involuntary, unexpressed, blame
with respect to persons who do not deserve it.
172 Friedman, “How to Blame People Responsibly,” 275.
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115

lacks a clear target to respond to or challenge (either with respect to the content of the
criticism or the standing of the agent delivering the criticism). This is a less significant
problem in interpersonal condemnation. For instance, when a person blames me, I have
someone to address; I can reject his standing to blame, his understanding of the situation,
the merits of his normative claim, and so on. But when a business blames by firing an
employee, the recipient of the blame does not have the opportunity to engage in a dialog or
challenge the criticism—there is no clear person to engage with in a moral conversation.
Lastly, when there are millions of wrongful blamers, the “responsiveness condition”
seems to place an onerous demand on the blame-recipient; having to engage in a dialog with
millions of blamers, and to have to defend oneself against each of the accusations, simply for
the opportunity to have blame that was undeserved in the first place disavowed, seems to be
an extremely unfair implication of the responsiveness condition.
That the blamer after a dialogue can “revise the original blaming accusation” or stop
blaming the (former) blame recipient misses the point.173 While having the dialogue after the
wrongful blaming has occurred is surely better than not having the dialogue, this is akin to a
person being exonerated for a crime on the basis of DNA evidence after completing only
half of his fifty-year sentence. No part of that sentence should have been completed.
The question of what sort of norms ought to guide our behavior after blaming has
already occurred is an interesting and important question. But this question is distinct from
the question of how we can reduce instances of wrongful blaming from occurring. The
additivity principle can help us from wrongfully blaming another in the first place.
173

Ibid., 276.

116

How to Distribute the Pie
I want to gesture at some issues pertaining to, for lack of a better term, distributive
fairness, that may arise due to the communal nature of our blaming practices. We might hold
the following kind of view:
Fraction: The deserved amount of blame, Z, that the wrongdoer could be
permissibly subjected to should be assigned according to some fair rule among the
members of the community.
So, we might think once we assign the amount of blame the wrongdoer deserves among the
members of the community, the members of the community have pro-tanto reason to
distribute only their assigned amount of blame (that is, their assigned fraction of Z).
Unfortunately, Fraction has serious problems. Let’s suppose that a fair rule is an
egalitarian rule of sorts, one that requires assigning the amount of blame into equal shares.
Suppose also Anthony has performed some morally heinous act for which he deserves X
amount of blame. Further suppose that there are five members of the moral community
[P1…P5]. According to Fraction, the amount of blame each member of the community has
pro-tanto reason to distribute is X/5 (since the amount of blame Anthony deserves is X, and
X is assigned evenly between the five members of the community).
But suppose a large batch of birth-control medication that was shipped out to
pharmacies was accidentally filled with control group pills with no active chemicals. The
population of the community rapidly expands to [P1…P500]. (I of course grasp how fanciful
this turn of events in the example is, but I think it will help highlight an interesting feature of
blame). Now, according to Fraction, the amount of blame each member of the community
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has pro-tanto reason to distribute is X/500 (since the amount of blame Anthony deserves is
X and X is divided evenly between the five hundred members of the community).
This result is problematic because no person in the community would have pro-tanto
reason to blame Anthony in any full-throated manner, despite his having performed a
heinous act. This is because each person is assigned to blame Anthony a tiny fraction of the
amount of blame he deserves. It would be odd if the most one could do in response to an
egregious act is a slight furrow of one’s eyebrows to express blame. The problem with
Fraction might be that it fails to account for the possibility that after a certain point, the
amount of blame a person deserves does not divide up in the right sort of way. Perhaps if we
split up the amount of blame a person deserves too finely, we lose the very thing we were
dividing up. The thought might go, for blame to be blame it needs to be disbursed at a
certain level of intensity and is not divisible below a certain point. I am reminded of
examples discussed in the broader moral philosophy literature concerning splitting a bottle
of water among many thirsty individuals in a desert. If we divide the water across too many
individuals, none of the individuals get the benefit of the water.
A similar problem arises in the other direction. Suppose Anthony has performed
some minor immoral act for which he deserves Y amount of blame. Further suppose that
there are 100 members of the moral community [P 1…P100]. According to Fraction, the
amount of blame each member of the community has pro-tanto reason to distribute is
Y/100 (since the amount of blame Anthony deserves is Y and Y is divided evenly between
the one hundred members of the community). But suppose, tragically, a fatal contagious
disease infects the community killing a large portion of the community—only [P1-P5] remain.
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Now, according to Fraction, the amount of blame each member of the community has protanto reason to distribute is Y/5 (since the amount of blame Anthony deserves is Y and Y is
assigned evenly between the five members of the community). Now we would need to say
that strictly because of the population change, each member of the moral community has
pro-tanto reason to distribute twenty times the amount of blame as before. When fewer
individuals are responsible for distributing all of the blame, they would have to express it
much more harshly and much more intensely. Perhaps there are moral limits to how
intensely one person should blame another; maybe it is inappropriate for any one member of
the community to blame another member of the community too harshly or intensely.
Alternatively, perhaps it is just not possible for a fewer number of people to subject the
wrongdoer to the entirety of the blame he deserves; one might think that getting past a
certain threshold of blame requires a level of alienation that only comes with having many
people blaming.
This discussion has assumed that we ought to recalculate the shares of blame at each
time slice where there is a change in the composition of the moral community. Perhaps this
is not the case: once the distribution is made, perhaps the result is final. We might think, so
much the worse for subjecting the wrongdoer to the amount of blame he or she deserves, in
cases of population decreases. With respect to population increases, we might say, blame is
not the sort of thing that each member of the community needs to get a turn with; if you
arrive on the scene after the distribution has been decided, no blaming for you.
If we do want to say that we should reassign the blame at each time slice when there
is a change in population size, we also face the question of what to do when some portion of
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the population has used up their fair share and then the population changes in size. Does
this mean they have blamed more than they should be entitled to? How should we then
assign the remaining amount of blame?
I will not be able to answer these questions here, but it does seem to me an
important area of inquiry, especially given the communal nature of our blaming practices.

What if the manager is justified in firing in response to a Twitter trial?
Suppose one thinks that my arguments in the dissertation are misguided and that
managers can, without any moral fault, fire employees for off-duty conduct that gives rise to
Twitter trials. We may then face the following question: Should those who have been at the
center of a Twitter trial be unable to work? I think an affirmative answer to this question
would be a bad result.
One might suggest that I am guilty of a similar mistake I attacked Werhane and
others for earlier: that is, just because there is a possibility that the terminated employee will be
unable to work again, legally speaking, it does not mean that this is what ought to happen,
morally speaking. This line of objection is difficult to make sense of in this context.
Let me clarify. I am not making a claim about what would be legally permissible. Nor
am I offering a hypothesis about the likelihood of an employee who was at the center of a
Twitter trial never being able to work again. Rather, I am making the point that if one thinks
that firing in response to a Twitter trial is morally unproblematic, one should also be
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committed to the thought that not hiring someone for having been in a Twitter trial is
morally unproblematic. This is because the moral flexibility associated with hiring someone
is greater than the moral flexibility associated with firing.
If this is so, those who reject my view would need to be comfortable with saying the
following: An employee’s having done a single immoral act that gives rise to a Twitter trial,
could justifiably serve as a decisive reason not to hire that person for any prospective
employers. If it did in fact ultimately serve as a decisive reason against hiring the person, and
the person who was at the center of the Twitter trial was never able to work again, neither
prospective employers (nor the past employer) would have done anything wrong in allowing
for this scenario to come about. This is the worry I am highlighting associated with holding
the view that firms are justified in firing an employee in response to a Twitter trial. To be
clear, I am not suggesting that this scenario is likely to occur, but rather, I am illustrating a
theoretical implication associated with holding the view that managers are justified in firing
an employee in response to a Twitter trial.
If one wants to reject my view, but also wants to hold that it would be wrong for
future employers not to hire a person on the grounds of having been in a Twitter trial, one
would need to reject the (I think plausible) premise that the moral flexibility associated with
hiring is greater than that associated with firing. One who wants to reject this premise might
offer the following kind of example: If John and Ben are friends but then Ben betrays John,
we might think that John would be morally justified in terminating the friendship. We might
also think that it would be wrong for Rob, Brian, Amy, and others who Ben encounters in
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the future to judge Ben not worthy of friendship, because of his having betrayed John. I
think this line of thought is misguided.
Perhaps we are morally required to keep an open mind with respect to people who
we have heard negative things about; however, it would be odd if there is a moral
requirement to befriend any particular person. There is a much stronger moral prohibition
against arbitrarily terminating a morally valuable relationship than there is a moral
requirement to form such a relationship.
Another objection to the worry I am highlighting might go as follows: there is always
a risk of those who are fired not being able to find work, not just those who were at the
center of a Twitter trial. Furthermore, if a person (suppose one who was not in a Twitter
trial), through sheer bad luck, was never able to work again, we do not find the need to say
that any particular employer acted wrongly in allowing for this unfortunate situation to come
about. I feel the force of this response, but I think it is not quite right. This is because the
reasons for why a person is not hired factor importantly into whether someone is morally
responsible.
There are certain reasons not to hire an employee that seem morally troubling. These
include the reasons pertaining to the constitutionally protected classes, but not just such
reasons. For example, suppose a manager is convinced that Tina is by far the best among the
candidates for the position of a software engineer: she is the most talented, personable, and
so on. The manager decides against hiring Tina only for the fact that he does not find her
attractive. Here, it seems that the manager has done something wrong. If every job Tina
applied to ended up not working out only because the hiring managers did not find her
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attractive, we might properly say that these prospective employers acted wrongly due to their
role in bringing about the situation Tina is in.
Given the importance of work, it would be an unfortunate result if those who have
once acted immorally in a way that brought about a Twitter trial are no longer able to work,
and that there is no one morally responsible for this result. I am not suggesting that it is
likely that they are going to be unable to work; rather, if they are unable to work, there would
be no complaint with respect to any employer that would have otherwise hired the person.
Moreover, many think those who have performed serious crimes should be permitted to
reintegrate into society, and some even think we owe it to such persons to help them with
reintegrating into the workforce. If we do indeed owe it to such persons to help reenter the
workforce, it would be odd to think that a person who was once at the center of a Twitter
trial, for some comparatively less serious immoral conduct, could no longer work, without
either past or prospective employers having done anything wrong.
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